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ABSTRACT 
Sri Lanka, particularly since 2008, has become more closely aligned with China 
in geopolitical affairs, upsetting the balance of its relationship with two other powers in 
the Indian Ocean: the United States and India. Sri Lanka has become more beholden to 
China for two main reasons—heavy indebtedness (more than $5 billion) and unfavorable 
terms and conditions agreed to with China in bilateral agreements while developing key 
infrastructure facilities in the country. After winning a 30-year-long war against terrorism 
in 2009, Sri Lanka now must struggle to extricate itself from a “debt trap” set by China.  
Against this background, this thesis explores the extent to which the Sri Lankan 
government can adopt nonalignment as the governing principle of its foreign policy. The 
thesis presents two possible scenarios: the successful adoption of nonalignment, 
balancing Sri Lanka’s geostrategic interests with major Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 
power players, and the failure to adopt nonalignment, putting Sri Lanka at risk to China’s 
coercive soft and hard power and compelling Sri Lanka to align more actively with the 
United States and India.  
This thesis evaluates historical evidence and recent developments, considers the 
status quo, and conducts a threefold case study of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. 
This thesis shows that nonalignment could promote balance in geopolitics and the 
international political economy in the 21st century. Finally, this thesis makes two types of 
recommendations; one specific to Sri Lanka, and the other suggesting a nonalignment 
model for economically weaker countries to follow when dealing with stronger countries.  
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Sri Lanka’s financial indebtedness to China and bilateral agreements between the 
two countries for huge infrastructure projects in the country have made Sri Lanka more 
beholden to China in the late post-independence period. The current situation, in which 
Sri Lanka is becoming more aligned with China, has diverted Sri Lanka from adopting a 
balance posture—specifically nonalignment—in its international relations, particularly 
with  powerful countries interested in Indian Ocean geopolitics. The relationship between 
China and Sri Lanka, stretching from at least the first century CE, has become more 
significant to Sri Lanka in terms of bilateral trade and financial aid in the post-
independence period. China’s financial aid in the early post-independence period, from 
1950 to 1975, totaled approximately $130.7 million over a quarter century; whereas, in 
the post late-independence period, from 2005 to 2015, China’s financial aid to Sri Lanka 
had exceeded $ 5 billion—some 38 times more in comparing the financial aid status in 
the early post-independence period.1 Sri Lanka’s foreign relations in the early post-
independence period featured neutrality and nonalignment, whereas Sri Lanka seems to 
be becoming more beholden to China in the late post-independence period, mainly 
because of its heavy indebtedness. This status quo—in which Sri Lanka is diverting from 
nonalignment and becoming more aligned with China—has been negatively viewed by 
the two other power players in Indian Ocean geopolitics—the United States and India. 
Development activities taking place in Sri Lanka and funded with Chinese 
financial aid in the late post-independence period—a harbor, an airport, a port city, a port 
terminal, an international conference hall, an international cricket stadium, and a 
highway—have had more invisible impacts on Sri Lanka than its concrete debts to China. 
Having committed to developing more infrastructure to increase its economic potential, 
Sri Lankan government has fallen into a “pit of debt,” dragging the country to a weak 
                                                 
1 John Franklin Cooper, Chinese Foreign Aid (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1976), 42–45, 53–55. 
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economic condition.2 According to Sri Lanka’s own official records, the country owes its 
financiers $64.5 billion—more than $5 billion of this sum to China.3 The “country’s debt 
to GDP [gross domestic product] ratio currently remains between 75 percent and 95.4 
percent,” and consumes a significant portion of government revenues to pay down the 
debt.4 Although Sri Lanka’s indebtedness to China is only 7.8 percent, infrastructure 
developed with China’s financial aid extends along the western and southern coastal area, 
nearly covering one-fifth of the total perimeter length of the country; thus, the 
infrastructure in place has imposed a far greater impact than its dollar value.   
Meanwhile, the newly elected 2015 Sri Lankan administration came under 
pressure from India to restrict its economic activities with China. As highlighted by Iromi 
Drarmawardana, the 2015 government received support from the United States and India 
to topple the former administration with an understanding that Sri Lanka would support 
the core interests of the United States and India in regional affairs.5 When the Sri Lankan 
government temporarily suspended the port city project to accommodate India’s 
demands, the Chinese government told Sri Lanka “the project should be seen in 
continuity as the Chinese government had reached agreement with the last government to 
conduct this project.”6 Finally, the Sri Lankan administration resumed the project under a 
new name—Colombo International Finance City—leaving Indian pressure aside.7 
 
                                                 





5 Iromi Dharmawardana, Sri Lanka Foreign Policy under Sirisena-Wickramasinghe Government 
(Sinappore: National University of Singapore, December 2016), 4. 
6 Ranjith Seneviratne, “Sri Lanka Government Holds up Beijing Funded $ 1.5 Billion Colombo Port 
City Project,” Economic Times, March 6, 2015, http://www.economictimes.indiantimes.com. 
7 Annie Gowen, “Can Sri Lanka’s New Government Break Free from China,” Washington Post, 
August 16, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/;  “Colombo Port City: What You 
Need to Know in a Nutshell and More,” Ada Derana, August 22, 2016, http://www.adaderana.lk/news.php. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Against this background, Sri Lanka has stepped into a complex geopolitical 
scenario in its foreign affairs in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In a way, Chinese 
financial assistance has resulted in meaningful projects, particularly in infrastructure 
developments, as well as in expanding and deepening Sri Lankan relations with China. 
On the other hand, Sri Lanka might now be more beholden to China for infrastructure 
developed along the coastal belt of two main provinces—the Western and the Southern 
provinces—with Chinese financial aid. Adding a third dimension to the scenario, the 
United States and India have now become involved in questioning whether Sri Lanka has 
become more closely aligned with China. Given Sri Lanka’s geopolitical situation, this 
thesis asks the following research question: How can Sri Lanka best balance its foreign 
relations with Indian Ocean power players—the United States, China, and India—
given its heavy indebtedness to China for infrastructure projects?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE  
This study has significance not only for Sri Lanka but the region, considering the 
importance of the Indian Ocean and the geostrategic prominence of Sri Lanka in the 
Indian Ocean. Since the turn of the new millenium, South Asia and its IOR have emerged 
as a focus of international concerns.8 In this context, the United States as the global super 
power, China as an emerging global economic power, and India as the main regional 
power of South Asia have different but specific interests in the Indian Oceanand its 
control. 
The sea lines in the Indian Ocean are considered among the most strategically 
important ones in global maritime trade. Nearly “50 percent of the world’s seaborne trade 
in oil transits through the Indian Ocean choke points,”9 and following are the 
approximate percentages of oil transported through different choke points:  “4 percent 
                                                 
8 Bhagya Seneviratne, Sri Lanka’s Strategic Relevance in the South Asian Region: An Analysis of 
India’s Indian Ocean and China’s Maritime Silk Route Initiative (Ratmalana: KDU publication, November 
2015), 94. 
9 Ibid., 95. 
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passing through Strait of Hormuz,”10 “35 percent through the Strait of Malacca, and 8 
percent through the Bab el Mandeb Strait.” “Sea lines both through the Strait of Malacca 
and through the Bab el Mandeb Strait are routed through the Indian Ocean”11; thus, both 
sea routes make Sri Lanka equally important because of its close proximity to these sea 
lines.12 
“The Maritime Silk Road, or the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic 
Belt, is a Chinese strategic initiative to increase investment and foster collaboration 
across the historic Silk Road,’13 which adds to the Indian Ocean’s significance. “China’s 
soft power diplomacy” in shaping the Indian Ocean strategic environment has its end 
routes in the Chinese Maritime Silk Route strategy.14 As emphasized by Bhagya 
Seneviratne, China has developed considerable goodwill among the countries in the 
Indian Ocean, by providing financial assistance on lucrative repayment terms, investing 
in the major infrastructure projects, as well as supplying military hardware, and extending 
political support, particularly in the UN Security Council—through its veto powers—as 
well.15 Considering China’s overall soft power strategy in the IOR, Sri Lanka has become 
a strategic partner to China in its Maritime Silk Route strategy.   
The Chinese projects in Sri Lanka include a port and an airport, which can 
influence the geostrategic interests in the IOR.16 The second project is constructing an 
offshore city on reclaimed land, a considerable portion of which China holds on a long-
term lease basis.17 Thus, China is going to show its presence in the IOR over the longer  
 
 





14 Ibid., 96. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Wade Shepard, “Sri Lanka and China’s Hambantota Debacle May Now Be ‘Too Big to Fail,’” 




term, leveraging its connections to and in Sri Lanka, among other places. At the same 
time, Sri Lanka is now facing difficulties in paying back its debts to China and has 
become more beholden to China because of its indebtedness.18 In such a scenario, this 
study is significant because it examines which options Sri Lanka has to protect its 
geostrategic interests while benefiting from China’s financial assistance.  
Contemporary case studies that examine Chinese investments in other countries, 
particularly in South Asia, and its regional hegemony are significant to identify Chinese 
behavior in international affairs. China has made financial investments in infrastructure 
developments—sea ports and inland highway networks—in Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
Studying how China has financially aided Pakistan and Bangladesh in infrastructure 
development and how such projects affect the geostrategic interests of the two countries 
provides significant comparative case studies for this thesis. Further, another case study 
that examines China’s influence on Vietnam—also helps to identify China’s hegemonic 
behavior in a regional context. 
C. CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN INTERESTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
SRI LANKA 
China’s foreign policy has evolved from conflict to cooperation from the 20th to 
the 21st century.19 China’s foreign policy in the 1950s to 1970s was conflictual—
“confrontations with the United States in the 1950s and 1960s”20  and “conflict with 
Soviet Union in 1960s and 1970s”21—changed to a cooperative one in the 1977–1989 
period, with the changes in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Chinese 
Communist Party, particularly the change of leadership from Mao Tse Tung to Deng 
Xiaoping.22 During the period from 1970 to 2009, China increased its diplomatic  
 
                                                 
18 Hugo Cox, “New Sri Lanka Government Hobbled by Old Chinese Debt,” January 29, 2015, 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/01/29/new-sri-govenment-hobbled-by-old-c... 
19 Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, Chines Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 375. 




relations with up to 156 countries, and showed the following progress in its diplomatic 
relations: in 1970 with 57 countries, in 1979 with 119 countries, in 1989 with 137 
countries, and with 156 countries in 2009.23 Sri Lanka established diplomatic relations 
with China in 1957, making it one of the few countries that have had long-term 
diplomatic relations with China.24  
As highlighted by Jingdong Yuan, China has more concerns over the IOR mainly 
because of its maritime interests, seeking to eliminate maritime bottlenecks in the Indian 
Ocean—at Malacca in particular—in order to ensure an uninterrupted supply of energy to 
China.25 China has become the second largest oil consumer after the United States, and 
its total oil consumption per day is 8 million barrels. China imports a considerable 
portion of its oil requirement—up from 4.8 million barrels per day in 1993 to 7.1 million 
barrels per day in 2015—and China predicts that this oil importation will reach 13.1 
million barrels per day in 2030.26 Therefore, China worries about oil sources as well as 
the elimination of bottlenecks in transporting that oil; thus, the IOR becomes critical for 
China in meeting its all-important oil needs.  
China believes that controlling the IOR is a contributory factor for it to gain 
regional and global hegemonic status. Yuan, having analyzed the hegemonic status quo 
from China’s perspective, highlights the following aspects as evidence of the importance 
of the IOR for regional and global hegemonies: first was Napoleon’s ambition to control 
the Indian Ocean as the first step towards global hegemony; second, in the 19th century, 
Britain and Russia collided in Afghanistan over the attempt to control the Indian Ocean; 
third, in WWII Japan and Germany planned to achieve victories in the Pacific and 
                                                 
23 R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History, 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall Publications, 2011), 369. 
24 Cooper, Chinese Foreign Aid, 12. 
25 John Garofano and Andrea J. Dew, Deep Currents and Rising Currents: The Indian Ocean and 
International Security (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 157. 
26 Ibid., 158. 
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European theatres, and then to link up with the Indian Ocean.27 Therefore, China 
considers the Indian Ocean historically as an arena of great power competition.28    
Against this background, China’s strategy towards the IOR has been seen as a part 
of its grand strategy that includes the “string of pearls,” 29  the proposed construction of 
seaports and pipelines—a link of Chinese geopolitical influences in the Indian Ocean.30 
This nexus of nodes includes the following locations for the ports and pipelines: Hainan 
Island, Woody Island in the South China Sea, Chitagong in Bangladesh, a 1,200-
kilometer (km)-long pipeline from the port of Sittwe in Myanmar to Yunnan province in 
China, the Gwadar port in Pakistan, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, and the Kra Isthmus 
in Thailand.31 In this context, China has developed and strengthened its friendly 
relationships with the countries in the IOR. Similarly, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, 
and Sri Lanka have become important partners in China’s maritime strategy.32 China has 
developed considerable goodwill among the countries in the Indian Ocean—Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Bangladesh—by providing financial assistance on attractive repayment terms 
and investing in major infrastructure projects—seaports, airports, and road networks.33 
The main seaports of China’s String of Pearls strategy and the key locations in its Silk 
Road Strategy are shown in Figure 1.  
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 162. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Bhagya Seneviratne, Sri Lanka’s Strategic Relevance in the South Asian Region, 95–96. 
33 Ibid., 96. 
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Figure 1.  China’s String of Pearls as of 2011.34  
China’s String of Pearls strategy appears to be two-pronged—economic and 
military. As highlighted by Prem Mahadeven, the String of Pearls hypothesis, advanced 
by the U.S. consulting firm of Booz Allen Hamilton in 2005, asserts that China fuses its 
economic and military strength in the IOR.35 Although according to the String of Pearls 
theory, China appears to be building maritime infrastructure along the IOR periphery, as 
suggested by Mahadeven, it could covertly facilitate China reaching agreements with 
local governments—in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Burma—to create dual-use 
of port facilities to establish naval bases later.36 Out of three fleets of the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—North, East, and South Sea Fleets—PLAN is capable 
of deploying ten warships, one attack submarine, and one replenishment ship in the IOR 
                                                 
34 Source: Christina Lin, “The New Silk Road: China’s Energy Strategy in the Great Middle East,” 
Washington Institute, April 2011, 2, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-silk-
road-chinas-energy-strategy-in-the-greater-middle-east. 
35 Prem Mahadevan, “China in the Indian Ocean: Part of a Large Plan,” CSS Analysis in Security 




on a continuous basis.37 China has been expanding its South Sea Fleet since 2008.38 
Present indications show that the PLAN aims to gain its carrier operations after 2020, 
having developed PLAN capabilities up to four Carrier Battle Groups.39 Nevertheless, 
China shows its behavior in the Indian Ocean as a “peaceful rise,”40  by which it 
concentrates on economic imperatives, particularly in protecting its commodity shipping 
lanes in the IOR.41 Therefore, in the overall context of the IOR’s importance to China, 
Sri Lanka becomes a one of the important pearls in its String of Pearls strategy.    
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the research question is a very current one, the literature analysis mainly 
focuses on conceptual and theoretical aspects of solving debt issues involved with the 
political economy, power politics—soft and hard power coercion—and international 
relations. Thus, the literature review conducts an analysis of the following conceptual and 
theoretical aspects: initially, economic interdependence, debt payments, debt negotiations 
and renegotiations, as well as debt rescheduling; then, international power politics, 
particularly influence—through soft and hard power; and finally, how economic issues 
relate to foreign affairs—alignment, realignment, and nonalignment. The literature on 
political economy, particularly on economic coercion and economic interdependency, 
shows how economically weaker countries become the targets of the stronger economies. 
Further, the ineffective use of foreign aid has mostly led to increasing and uncontrollable 
debt levels, ultimately putting weaker countries in debt traps. The literature on debt 
payments, negotiation, renegotiation, and rescheduling shows a variety of options to 
manage indebtedness under different terms and conditions. However, the heavy 
indebtedness and the terms and conditions agreed upon by the lender and the borrower 
open two avenues for economically strong lenders to apply coercion through soft and  
 







hard power. Literature on alignment, realignment, and nonalignment shows the 
importance of a balanced foreign policy, particularly for weaker countries to maintain a 
balance in international power politics.  
1. Economic and Political Economic Literature 
A volume of literature on political economy links stronger economies with 
economically weaker countries through economic coercion and economic 
interdependence. Economic coercion—“an act by a sender government or governments to 
disrupt economic exchange with the target state, unless the target acquiesces to an 
articulated demand”42—appears as a prominent tool in international politics throughout 
history, and it is equally applicable in the current context. Most of the theories of 
coercion show a model in which the sender interrupts the status quo and blocks the flow 
of “economic exchange” with “target country or countries.”43 Robert O. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye contend that the world has increasingly become economically 
interdependent based on human aspirations.44 Literature on interdependence highlights 
that sensitivity to interdependence affected the United States, Japan, and Western Europe 
in the years from 1973 to1975, when oil prices increased.45 The Sri Lankan economy, 
too, depends on global trade, and Sri Lanka cannot become isolated from rest of the 
world, having only established bilateral trade with China.     
The effective use of foreign aid would lead aid-receiving countries to recover 
from the poverty trap; whereas, the ineffective use of foreign aid might put developing 
countries into debt traps. Literature highlights the volume of foreign aid flowing into 
developing countries over the last 50 years—US$2.3 trillion in general—and in the year 
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2006, it reached $103.6 million.46 According to public interest theory, developing 
countries require foreign aid to fill financing or investment gaps, and such aid assists 
countries to emerge from the so-called “poverty trap.”47 Therefore, the effective use of 
foreign aid becomes an incentive for both the government and the citizens of 
economically weaker countries to recover from the “poverty trap”.48 By contrast, the 
ineffective use of foreign aid is very likely to put the aid-receiving countries into a “debt 
trap.”49 In the Sri Lankan context—though Sri Lanka has utilized foreign aid obtained 
from China for infrastructure development—the question remains why such 
infrastructure failed to become income generating. Such failure has now negatively 
affected the debt repayments and is putting Sri Lanka in a “debt trap. ”50  
Economic literature on debt buildup shows how the ratio of debt to GDP has 
imposed pressure on public finance when debt levels increase beyond a reasonable 
repayable level. The way in which debtis accumulated contributes to its economic 
impacts and subsequent ways for exiting from the debt.51 For example, war debt may be 
less problematic for future growth because high war-time government expenditures 
decrease rapidly when peace returns.52 Economic and financial crises also contribute to 
the increase in debt, and the recent “2008–2009 crisis”53 has already put considerable 
strain on debt and public finance in “euro-area countries.”54 Since the new infrastructure 
developed in Sri Lanka has not sufficiently strengthened the country’s economy, the Sri 
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50 Wade Shepard, “Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and the World’s Emptiest Airport Go to the 
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52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 8. 
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Lankan economic situation has been strained by debt to some extent.55  However, the 
wartime government expenditure changed considerably in 2010 with the termination of 
internal conflict in mid-2009, and Sri Lanka needed institutional reforms to increase its 
economic development.56  
Debt rescheduling correlates the conditions imposed by the lender—either a 
single country or an international financial organization—with the domestic political 
situation of the borrower—political stability and political ideologies. Though debt 
rescheduling appears as another option for debt payment, the domestic environment can 
negatively influence debt rescheduling.57 When debt payments exceed contractual 
obligations, the creditor government and international organizations can intervene to 
reschedule the debt payments.58 In such a scenario, both governments—creditor and 
debtor—must cope with the conditions defined by international organizations or mutual 
agreements between two countries.59 The International Monetary Fund and the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade focused on government agreements in the 1970s, and 
brought officials to discuss bringing down the debt levels.60 However, domestic factors 
such as political stability, anti- or pro-capitalist ideology, and corruption have greater 
influences over options for rescheduling the debts.61 According to Vinod Aggrawal and 
Martha Finnemore, debt restructuring is a part of the bargaining process as follows:  
International debt rescheduling, both in earlier epochs and our present one, 
has been marked by a flurry of bargaining. In this process, significant 
variation has emerged over time and across cases in the extent to which 
debtors have undertaken economic adjustment, banks or bondholders have 
written down debts, and creditor governments and international 
organizations have intervened in negotiations. Debt Games develops and 
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56 K. Renuka Ganegodage and Alicia N. Rambaldi, Economic Consequences of War: Evidence from 
Sri Lanka (Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland, 2013), 2, 5, 6, 10. 
57 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 24. 
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applies a situational theory of bargaining to analyze the adjustment 
undertaken by debtors and the concessions provided by lenders in 
international debt rescheduling. This approach has two components: a 
focus on each actor’s individual situation, defined by its political and 
economic bargaining resources, and a complementary focus on changes in 
their position.62 
Another way of resolving debt issues is through debt renegotiations. The process 
of resolving debt crises through debt renegotiation, however, has changed since the 
1980s.63 In the 1970s and 1980s, the creditors were the banks; thus, the “Bank Advisory 
Committees” consisting of representatives of the major bank creditors were involved in 
the renegotiations.64 In contrast, after the mid-1990s, bondholders became the main 
creditors and had widely differing institutional characteristics.65  Therefore, debt 
restructuring took the form of “take-it–or–leave-it” exchange offers.66 Yet, Sri Lanka has 
the option of debt renegotiations, either bilaterally with China, or through international 
financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
2. International Power Politics and Foreign Relations  
A volume of literature has been written on soft and hard power, and its relation 
both with power coercion and foreign relations. As shown by Jan-Philipp Wagner, the 
concept of hard and soft power, either as individual theories or in combination, relate to 
foreign policies.67 Both Wagner and Colin S. Gray, referring to Joseph S. Nye, Jr, show 
that power is one of the most contestable theories in international power politics, and 
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scholars and commentators have distinguished soft and hard power in recent decades.68 
Hard power has mainly been achieved through “military threat” or the “use of power,” 
and by means of “economic menace.”69 Soft power, the latter version of power politics, 
involves one country influencing another nation by co-opting others to share the 
influencer’s values or some key elements in the influencer’s agenda to keep international 
order and security.70 As highlighted by Wagner, China has shown its soft power potential 
through its economic activities, particularly through infrastructure developments—ports 
and port facilities—under its capitalist state-led model.71 According to Gray, hard power 
obliges its interests by mainly calculating the costs and benefits; therefore, the 
international power players initially employ their soft power options before choosing the 
hard power approach, or coercion.72 Applying this scenario to the IOR context shows Sri 
Lanka that it needs to be cautious about the soft power exerted by China, as well as by 
India. 
Balanced foreign policies become more important as countries have become more 
interdependent on each other in present day global politics. As highlighted in the 
literature related to economics and foreign policy, countries struggling over economic 
issues need to pay more attention to strengthening relations with other countries through 
healthy foreign policies.73 International organizations such as the General Agreement on 
Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the IMF also advise governments to adjust financial 
policies to accommodate certain changes in domestic and foreign policies.74 Therefore, 
either as a member of international organizations or as an individual state, it is important 
to maintain a balanced foreign policy. Considering the importance of Sri Lanka’s 
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geographical location in the Indian Ocean and its geopolitical role with the IOR power 
players, Sri Lanka needs a balanced foreign policy to maintain a stable status quo in 
international power politics. 
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) became the leading organization in 
promoting independent foreign policies in international affairs. Out of the “nine features 
of non-aligned foreign policy” of NAM, the principle of “keeping the independent 
foreign policy for each nation”75 was considered as one of the most important principles 
promoting balanced foreign policies for the countries that neither belonged to the socialist 
nor the capitalist bloc during the Cold War. Nonalignment arose from the “desire of new 
states to keep their foreign policies independent from the possible pressures from the 
super powers” without aligning with any power bloc that would limit the “freedom of 
action” of a state.76 Furthermore, nonalignment prevents nations from becoming biased in 
their foreign policy based on narrow national interests.77 Therefore, nonalignment acts as 
a “source of independence and freedom of action”78 for any country despite of its size, 
wealth, and power.79 Thus, nonalignment appears as the favored principle for Sri Lanka’s 
foreign policy considering the interests of IOR power players in today’s context.   
Alignment, realignment, and bandwagoning are separate but interrelated theories 
in the balance of power. Steven R. David explains how alignment and realignment occur 
in international politics.80 Alignment means that “one state brings its policies with the 
cooperation with another state to achieve mutual security requirements.”81 The balance-
of-power theory explains how and why states align with other states to protect 
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themselves.82 Further, balance-of-power theory shows the reasons for states to align with 
other states when a particular state recognizes the emergence of hegemonic power or 
power coercion that threatens its survival.83  Bandwagoning in international relations is a 
strategy employed by weak states against a strong state by aligning with one or more 
other stronger states to reduce the disproportionalities, and to defeat the adversary 
together with the stronger partner(s).84 Two examples of bandwagoning behaviors are the 
alignment of Finland with the Soviet Union after WWII and Egypt’s turn toward the 
United States after the October 1973 war.85 David shows how Egypt realigned with the 
United States, changing from its former alignment with the Soviet Union, as follows: 
From 1955 untill the 1973 October War, the Soviet Union had provided 
more economic and military assistance to Egypt than any other non-
communist states. Such support assisted Egypt to lead the Arab World 
against Israel. Though Egypt had reached the Soviet support at its peak; 
Anwar Sadat decided to forsake his alignment with Moscow and to realign 
with the United States, even though the United States was an ally of 
Israel.86   
 
David highlights that although bandwagoning predicts the opposite result of 
balancing, states align or realign as a reaction to external threats in order to survive.87 In 
the Sri Lankan context, if China were to exert its economic soft power, that might compel 
Sri Lanka to make an alignment or realignment with one of the other power players in the 
IOR. 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The conditions generated by the research question, and the concepts and theories 
distilled from the literature review suggest criteria to formulate probable hypotheses for 
the research question. Since Sri Lanka failed to convert the infrastructure developed from 
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Chinese financial aid to income generating mechanisms, Sri Lanka has become 
increasingly beholden to China by the contractual obligations included in the bilateral 
agreements. The research question considers the following factors: first, the geostrategic 
interests of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean; second, the exertion of soft and hard power, 
particularly from China, and pressure from the United States and India in response to Sri 
Lanka’s alignment with China; and third, the necessity for Sri Lanka to keep a balanced 
relationship with all three power players in the IOR. The analysis of the literature shows 
other key areas that need to be considered when formulating hypotheses for the research 
question. Such key areas emerged from the literature review: 1) the use of foreign aid to 
escape the poverty trap without being caught in a debt trap, 2) the importance of 
managing pressure from hard and soft power coercion, 3) the potential of nonalignment 
as a principle to maintain a balance in international affairs, and 4) an evolving 
nonalignment strategy that will ensure independence in foreign policy.  
The emerging criteria—discovered from the conditions generated by the research 
question, and the concepts and theories distilled from the literature review—show a set of 
dependent and independent variables to formulate two hypotheses, or a central hypothesis 
for the research question. The failure or success of integrating nonalignment as a 
principle, and managing soft and hard power coercion are the two independent variables 
for this thesis. Both of these independent variables change in response to how Sri Lanka 
manages its bilateral affairs with China in the process of debt renegotiation. Sri Lanka’s 
geostrategic interests, and its alignment and realignment with major power players in the 
Indian Ocean become dependent variables for the research. Depending on the behavior of 
the independent variables—integrating nonalignment, and managing soft and hard power 
coercion—Sri Lanka’s geostrategic interests either become balanced or imbalanced with 
the power players, and such changes in geostrategic interests would invite Sri Lanka to 
either align or realign with any of the major power players in the IOR. Therefore, the 
dependent and independent variables generate the following central hypothesis that rests 
at the heart of the present research: 
The extent to which the Sri Lankan government adopts nonalignment as 
the governing principle of its foreign policy when establishing new 
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bilateral agreements with China—to operate the new Hambantota harbor, 
the Mattala airport, the proposed economic zone in Hambantota, and to 
conduct commercial activities in the Colombo port city—will push Sri 
Lanka into one of two situations: 1) the successful adoption of 
nonalignment will balance Sri Lanka’s geostrategic interests with major 
power players in the IOR—the United States, China, and India; and 2) a 
failure to adopt nonalignment will make Sri Lanka subject to China’s 
coercive soft and hard power, compelling Sri Lanka to align more actively 
with the United States and India to keep its geostrategic interests 
balanced.  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research evaluates the historical evidence and recent developments, and 
conducts an analysis of Sri Lanka’s current situation. It also incorporates case studies 
examining the possible factors that affect the balance of geostrategic interests versus 
conditions that enable China to exert pressure through soft and hard power. Evaluation of 
the historical evidence on the bilateral relationship between Sri Lanka and China provides 
background information to test the probabilities of the hypothesis. Furthermore, an 
analysis of the reasons for Sri Lanka to choose China as the financial partner, and how 
Sri Lanka has addressed its geostrategic interests with new infrastructure developments 
enabled by Chinese financial aid and investments, provides evidence for or against the 
two dependent variables. Further, a close examination of the debt renegotiation effort and 
its latest progress provides evidence to test the two conditions of the central hypothesis—
success or failure to adopt nonalignment, and the corresponding effects—against recent 
developments. 
Three case studies provide evidence of China’s geostrategic interest in the IOR by 
expanding financial aid and developing infrastructure similar to the case of Sri Lanka, 
and China’s hegemonic behavior with Vietnam and in the South China Sea. The first two 
case studies, Pakistan and Bangladesh, resemble the Sri Lankan model: China’s financial 
aid for the construction and modernization of seaports—Gwadar in Pakistan and 
Chittagong in Bangladesh. Thus, two of the case studies provide evidence that balancing 
or unbalancing the geographical interests of the two countries favors China, and offers 
possibilities for China to create hegemonic conditions in the IOR. The third case study 
examines the regional hegemonic behavior of China in relation to Vietnam, and provides 
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possible implications for China’s hegemonic behavior in the second condition of the 
hypothesis—Sri Lanka failing to adopt nonalignment as the main principle of its foreign 
policy.  
This research makes a threefold analysis: Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, the interests 
of the two other power players in the IOR—the United States and India—and the findings 
of the research. The analysis of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy shows the two faces of Sri 
Lanka’s foreign policy: nonaligned foreign policy assisted it to maintain balanced 
relations with Indian Ocean power players in the late 1950s to early 1970s; whereas, the 
alignment and the realignment in the late 1970s and more recently have had other effects 
on Sri Lanka. An analysis of the U.S. and Indian interests in the Indian Ocean highlights 
the following key aspects: first, how the U.S. and Indian strategy in the IOR affects Sri 
Lanka; second, what interests the United States and India have in Sri Lanka; and lastly, 
what options Sri Lanka has to become nonaligned through realignment, protect itself 
against possible pressure from China? Analysis of the findings from historical evidence 
and from case studies tests the hypothesis for its probability.  
The last part of the thesis concentrates on recommendations. Recommendations 
are threefold: first, recommendations unique to Sri Lanka for managing a balanced 
relationship with all the IOR power players while repaying its debts to China; second, a 
model for weaker economies to prevent them getting trapped in power plays and 
hegemonic effects; and finally, recommendations for suitable areas in which to conduct 
future studies. This thesis concludes by explaining the critical need for nonalignment in 
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy.       
G. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS  
This thesis has five chapters, and incorporates the three main elements of research 
design into these five chapters. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter II has three 
sections evaluating historical evidence and recent developments in Sri Lanka’s debt 
renegotiation. The sections consider the bilateral relationship between Sri Lanka and 
China, Sri Lanka’s choice of China as its financial partner in the post-2005 period, and 
the progress of debt renegotiation. The first section of Chapter II examines the historical 
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relationship between Sri Lanka and China, and evaluates how the bilateral relationship 
affected Sri Lanka’s geostrategic interests in the early post-independence period. The 
second section highlights the reason for Sri Lanka to choose China as its financial partner 
in the late post-independence period—post-2005—and how Sri Lanka has addressed its 
geostrategic interests with new infrastructure developments through Chinese financial aid 
and investments. The third section studies the progress of the debt renegotiation efforts 
with China. 
Chapter III is organized in two sections, containing South Asian and Southeast 
Asian case studies. In the first section, two countries in South Asia where China has 
invested to develop seaports and road networks—Pakistan and Bangladesh—are 
examined from different points of view. First, I examine how Chinese financial aid and 
infrastructure developments have influenced the geostrategic interests of the two 
countries. In the second section, I analyze the hegemonic behavior of China in the South 
China Sea, using Vietnam as the example.  
Chapters IV and V are the analysis and the recommendations chapters, 
respectively. The analysis chapter offers evidence supporting the likelihood of the two 
conditions of the central hypothesis, based on following: 1) the shift of Sri Lanka’s 
foreign policy from nonalignment to alignment and then to realignment, and 2) the 
interests of the United States and India as the power players in the Indian Ocean and on 
Sri Lanka. The analysis focuses on the likelihood of Sri Lanka balancing its geostrategic 
interests and preventing China’s power coercion in the IOR (or the converse), as 
outcomes of debt renegotiation. Chapter V offers three types of recommendations—a Sri 
Lankan-specific recommendation, a recommended model for weaker economies, and 
recommended areas for future studies. The thesis concludes by recommending Sri Lanka 
become nonaligned through realignment.  
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II. THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SRI LANKA 
AND CHINA: AN ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY EVIDENCE 
This chapter broadly addresses the historical and contemporary evidence on 
bilateral relations between China and Sri Lanka, and evaluates the reasons for and 
impacts of Sri Lanka selecting China as its main financial partner in recent development 
programs. This chapter  further examines the nature and the development of bilateral 
relations between China and Sri Lanka, and investigates whether China had exercised 
undue influence over Sri Lanka in the past, in the pre–colonial period and in the post–
independence period. Chapter II contains three sections. The first briefly covers the 
salient aspects of the systematic development of the bilateral relationship from the first 
century until Sri Lanka became a colony. The second section evaluates the bilateral 
relationship in trade, financial assistance, and infrastructure developments in terms of 
Chinese aid in the post-independence period, particularly from 1948 to 2005 and from 
2005 to 2017. The third section covers recent development efforts undertaken by the two 
countries—the southern terminal of the Colombo harbor, southern highway, Hambantota 
harbor, airport, international cricket stadium, and international conference hall—together 
with the outcome of the debt renegotiation process, through which Sri Lanka enters into a 
new bilateral venture with China by leasing the newly constructed harbor to China.  
A. SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
FROM THE FIRST CENTURY UNTIL SRI LANKA BECAME A 
COLONY 
Historically, the relationship between China and Sri Lanka goes back to the first 
and second centuries, and it could be observed that the bilateral relationship between the 
two countries has gradually increased since the fourth century. As highlighted by B.E.S.J. 
Bastianpallai, kings of Sri Lanka visited China in the first and second centuries, and these 
visits can be interpreted as a means of maintaining diplomatic relations between Sri 
Lanka and China in olden days. These visits began with Sri Lankan King Vasabha and 
extended to King Kuda Naga in the first century, and from King Sri Naga I to King 
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Mahasena in the second century, meeting with the Ming Dynasty in China.88 From the 
fourth century onward, the religious factor, too, contributed to the development of the 
bilateral relationship between Sri Lanka and China; the storied Chinese traveler Faxian 
and a team of monks of the Jin Dynasty not only visited Sri Lanka more than once, but 
also stayed in the country for some time.89 Indeed, Faxian’s visit to Sri Lanka in 411 is 
recorded as the longest sojourn by a Chinese delegation in Sri Lanka, lasting for two 
years.90  Similarly, a number of Sri Lankan Buddhist priests’ delegations—Bhikkus and 
Bhikkunis—visited China, and these visits reflect mainly the religious and cultural bonds 
between the two countries, particularly in the fifth to eighth centuries.91   
Apart from the diplomatic relations between the kings of both countries and the 
religious bonds, the trade activities between the two countries also began in the first and 
second centuries. In the first century, a Chinese navigator—Zheng of Ming Dynasty—
sailed to Sri Lanka many times, and established the initial foundation for trade between 
the two countries.92 Between 406 and 762, most trade was in the form of exchanging 
goods, and mostly Sri Lanka’s pearls, precious stones, and filigreed gold had been 
exchanged for Chinese silk, aloes, clove wood, and sandalwood.93 The bilateral trade 
between China and Sri Lanka declined from the eighth century onward when the “Malay 
empire of Sri Vijaya” took up frequent commercial activities with China.94 Sri Lanka 
resumed its trade with China from the mid-15th century, and the following items were 
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added to bilateral trade during this period: cotton cloth, rattan ware, golden orioles, black 
pepper, and herbal medicine.95    
While resuming its bilateral trade with Sri Lanka in the 15th century, China had 
persuaded Sri Lanka to accept its supremacy through overt and covert actions, and such 
activities could be identified as China’s influence over Sri Lanka in the historical 
perspective. Bastianpallai, based on Chinese sources, shows that the Chinese Ming 
Emperor sent an envoy led by Yung Lo and Cheng Ho had tried to get the sacred Tooth 
Relic to China, and the Chinese delegation had also tried to set up an inscription—
recording Chinese presence—in the southern part of Sri Lanka in 1409. As highlighted by 
Bastianpallai, the Chinese Ming Emperor tried to approach the Sri Lankan king through 
his close nobles, having given them bribes and gifts.96  Once this overt act and covert 
intentions were revealed to the Sri Lankan King—Alagathkonara—he attempted to 
capture Cheng Ho, thus challenging China’s imperial power.97 As a result, later in early 
411, Cheng Ho captured Alagathkonara and his family after a battle, and the Chinese 
emperor tried to replace Alagahakonara with someone who would favor the emperor.98 In 
the mid-15th century, King Prakramabahu IV firmly united Sri Lanka; thereafter, China 
could not further interfere with Sri Lankan domestic affairs.99 
B. BILATERAL TRADE AND FINANCIAL AID IN THE EARLY POST–
INDEPENDENCE PERIOD FROM 1948 TO 2005 
Sri Lanka managed to keep its head above water—avoided being heavily in 
debt—while maintaining a high level of bilateral relations, conducting favorable trade, as 
well as obtaining financial assistance for its infrastructure developments from China in 
the early post-independence period from 1948 to 2005. This section shows the following 
salient features of bilateral relations between China and Sri Lanka in the early post-
independent period and which have continued more than over five decades. First, China 
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recognized Sri Lanka’s foreign policy as a nonaligned one during the Cold War period. 
Second, China used a soft power policy in its economic activities with Sri Lanka. Third, 
Sri Lanka obtained financial aid from China to develop well established, ongoing 
industries, such as rubber, and kept its debts within a manageable level; indebtedness 
from the 1950s to 1980s remained at US$ 130 million. Finally, there was the likelihood 
of China’s plans to get Sri Lanka involved in crisis situations in the South Asian region, 
such as China’s plan to open a second front through Sri Lanka in the Indo–China war. Sri 
Lanka’s ability to manage its debt level with China prevented Sri Lanka from becoming 
beholden to China in the early post-independence period. Further, Sri Lanka’s nonaligned 
foreign policy appeared as a strong advantage to manage crucial situations when Sri 
Lanka had to become involved in the regional/subregional power politics in Asia and 
South Asia. Such situations included the Indo–China War, and China’s military strategy 
to hold Sri Lanka among its military options based on economic commitments. Despite 
all this, Sri Lanka managed to keep its debt level manageable while maintaining its 
bilateral relations with China in the early post-independence period.       
Bilateral relations between China and Sri Lanka, in the early post-independence 
period began immediately after Sri Lanka won independence from Britain in 1948, and 
those relation continued to improve throughout the early post-independence period. 
Although Sri Lanka established its diplomatic relations with China in 1957, in the very 
second year of Sri Lanka’s independence—1950—the two countries reestablished formal 
relations.100 With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Mao wanted to 
restore China’s former place in the world, and China considered Sri Lanka as a potential 
partner in this pursuit for two reasons: 1) Sri Lanka remained nonaligned with either of 
the power blocs; 2) Sri Lanka is geographically close to India.101 Sri Lanka’s role in 
organizing the second Afro-Asian conference also highly contributed to broadening the 
relationship between China and Sri Lanka in the early post-independence period.102 As 
highlighted by John Franklin Cooper, Chinese leaders wanted to strengthen bilateral 
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relations with Sri Lanka around 1962, when the border war took place with India, with a 
view to opening a possible second front against India.103 By the beginning of the 1970s, 
bilateral relations between the two countries seemed drastically improved and continued 
toward the latter part of the 1970s until domestic political changes occurred: the change 
of ruling political party in the 1977 elections.104 The state visit by Sri Lankan Prime 
Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranayke, to China in 1972 became significant because 
China-Sri Lanka economic relations started further strengthening with the Chinese 
bilateral aid package that included the construction of an international conference hall—
Bandaranayke International Memorial Conference Hall—as a donation from China.105 
Sri Lanka and China established bilateral trade and some trade agreements in the 
early post-independence period. The “Rubber–Rice pact”106 signed between China and 
Sri Lanka in 1952 is considered as the landmark for the beginning of bilateral ties in the 
modern history of early post-independence period of Sri Lanka.107 Through this pact, Sri 
Lanka agreed to import “270,000 metric tons of rice”108 every year, and China purchased 
“50,000 tons of rubber”109 each year, and the two countries signed the initial agreement 
for a period of five years, and the agreement was subsequently renewed every five years 
thereafter until 1982.110 This agreement lasted nearly 30 years, mainly because Sri Lanka 
had the comparative advantage by reaping the maximum financial benefit, as China was 
offering 40 percent more price for rubber than the existing market price, and was selling 
rice for less than a third of the market value.111 In 1958, the two countries signed a 
maritime agreement that ensured commercial and passenger service vessels between the 
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two countries be treated based on “Most Favored Nation (MFN)” status.112 When Sri 
Lanka experienced a food shortage in the early 1970s, China increased its rice quota 
exported to Sri Lanka in 1973 on the basis of paying its value in the following years’ 
rubber exportation, and 40,000 tons of Chinese rice reached Sri Lanka shortly. 
Furthermore, in the next year, China provided more than 50 percent of food aid to Sri 
Lanka, which helped Sri Lankan government to manage the foods requirement in the 
country.113 
China’s financial aid to Sri Lanka in the early post-independence period reached 
to $130 million, and financial aid was provided in the forms of financial aid and 
infrastructure development assistance. Sri Lanka became the second largest recipient of 
Chinese aid to non-communist Asian countries, and Table 1 shows how China has 
accommodated Sri Lanka in its financial aid program.114 Table 2 shows a summary of the 
main financial aid programs, indicating the type of financial aid and the nature of the 
projects established between the two countries. 
Table 1.   China’s Financial Aid to Non-communist Asian Countries 
from 1957 to 1973.115 
Nation Total Amount (in US$ 
Millions) 
Percentage 
Cambodia 97.5 10.4 
Nepal 44 4.7 
Indonesia 126 13.4 
Sri Lanka 130.70 13.9 
Burma 86.20 9.2 
Laos 32 3.4 
Pakistan 342 36.6 
Afghanistan 75.5 8.1 
Total 993.9 99.7 
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Table 2.   Summary of Types of Financial Aid Provided by China to Sri Lanka 





US$ Millions) Nature of Project 
1957 Grant 15.8 To facilitate economic development  
1958 Interest free 
loan 
10.5 Construction of a cotton mill 
1957 Flood relief 
grant 
1.2 Humanitarian  
1958 Loan 4.2  
1970 Loan 8.3 Construction of a textile factory 
1971 Interest free 
loan 
31.5 To overcome economic issues 
1972 Loan 5 To resolve the foreign exchange 
deficit 
1972 Interest free 
loan 
52 Construction of an integrated textile 
industry  
1973 Credit 1.7 Two cargo ships supplied on credit 
basis 
Total                                130.7  
 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, China-Sri Lanka bilateral relations remained unchanged; 
however, China became one of the few countries that provided military assistance—
military hardware and ammunition—to Sri Lanka. Although there was a change in the 
domestic politics in Sri Lanka—a change of government from the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) to the United National Party (UNP)—and, despite UNP’s tilt toward the 
United States and the West, the former bilateral economic projects between the two 
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providers to Sri Lanka since the mid–1980s in the country’s internal fight against the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).117 Beyond military assistance, China became 
the only country to “openly question India’s intervention”118 in Sri Lanka in 1987 over 
the issue of Sri Lanka’s internal conflict. At the time, India violated Sri Lanka’s airspace 
and dropped food items in the Northern parts of Sri Lanka while the Sri Lankan military 
was conducting a decisive military operation against the LTTE.119 As noted by Thomas 
Wheeler, though China became a less important trade partner for Sri Lanka in the 1990s, 
it remained a very large arms dealer with Sri Lanka.120 Even so, bilateral economic 
activities maintained a comparatively lower profile. The following are three examples 
reflecting the continuity of bilateral relations in cultural and economic activities in the 
1980s and 1990s: 1) in 1981, the two countries established the Sri Lanka-China Society 
to strengthen the friendship links between the two nations; 2) the Sino-Sri Lanka Joint 
Trade Committee was established in 1984, and 3) the Sri Lanka-China Business 
Cooperation was established in 1994.121   
C. BILATERAL ACTIVITIES IN THE LATE POST–INDEPENDENCE 
PERIOD FROM 2005 TO 2015 
Two major reasons existed for Sri Lanka to look to China as its most favored 
financial partner in the late-independence period. Sri Lanka was becoming a middle 
income country, and fewer conditions were associated with China’s bilateral financial 
activities. Yet, these apparent advantages ultimately led Sri Lanka to suffer from two 
types of unintentional consequences: first, the consequences of economic soft power—
heavy indebtedness to China; and second, the consequences of hard powermilitary 
involvement. The facts highlighted in this section show a steady flow of diplomatic  
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relations, but a sudden increase in financial activities between China and Sri Lanka in the 
late post–independence period. The specific locations where the economic activities and 
economic-related infrastructure developments have taken place—Colombo harbor, 
Colombo port City, and port and airport at Hambantota—particularly along the western 
and southern coasts of Sri Lanka, show how China’s economic activities concentrated in 
the western and southern parts of Sri Lanka. At the same time, the southern highway—
constructed with Chinese financial assistance—has physically connected the new 
economic hubs to each other. Thus, in a larger picture, China’s covert soft power 
activities, on one hand, made Sri Lanka beholden to China through its heavy 
indebtedness. On the other hand, China has overtly dominated the western and southern 
coasts of Sri Lanka in terms of economic activities. Moreover, Sri Lanka realized how 
China has connected its soft power with its hard power when Chinese submarines 
surfaced at the terminal operated by CMPH in the Colombo harbor in 2014.  
Bilateral activities between China and Sri Lanka regained their momentum under 
Sri Lanka’s post-2005 administration, and the Golden Jubilee Celebrations of bilateral 
relations between the two countries became a landmark in the late post-independence 
period.122 An acceleration of bilateral activities took place in 2007, when Sri Lankan 
President Mahinda Rajapaksha visited China, signing eight bilateral agreements and 
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Table 3.   Agreements and MOUs established between China 
and Sri Lanka in 2007.124  
Agreement/MOU 
Nature of the 
Agreement/MOU Effect 
Agreement on Economic and Technical 







MOU between Ministry of Constructions 
of China and the Ministry of Urban 
Development and Sacred Area 







Agreement between the city of Guangzhou 
of China and District of Hambantota of Sri 
Lanka  






MOU between the Investment Promotion 
Agency of Ministry of Commerce of China 







MOU between the Film Bureau of the 
State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television of China and the National Film 
Cooperation of Sri Lanka 






MOU between the Red Cross Society of 








MOU between the Chinese Academy of 
Agriculture Mechanization Science and 
Department of Agriculture of the Ministry 






MOU between the Beijing Foreign Studies 
University of China and University of 








China’s financial aid in terms of loans and grants has exceeded $3.8 billion in the 
late post-independence period. Table 4 shows the breakdown of China’s aid to Sri Lanka, 
particularly between 2008 and 2012. Sri Lanka leaned toward China for financial 
assistance for three main reasons: 1) the possibility of quick loans with fewer conditions; 
2) the changes in regulations for providing funds for Sri Lanka after becoming a “lower 
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middle-income country” in the post-2008 period,125 and 3) the United States and some of 
Western countries suspended aid granted in the mid-2000s. The United States suspended 
aid; Germany reduced bilateral aid, and the UK suspended $3 million in debt relief.126 
According to the 2012 annual report of Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Finance and Planning, the 
financial aid obtained from China has been invested in road construction, power and 
energy, ports and shipping, and aviation, as shown in Figure 2. These infrastructure 
development projects include several aforementioned ones, as well as renovation of road 
networks—particularly, the northern main supply road. Areas where these projects have 
come up are shown in Figure 3.  
Table 4.   Loans and Grants Sri Lanka Obtained from China 
from 2009–2012.127 
Year 
In US$ Millions 
Loans Grants Total 
2009 1,204 2 1,206 
2010 821 8 829 
2011 760 - 760 
2012 1.056 - 1056 
Total 3841 10 3851 
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Figure 2.  Distribution of Loans in Different Development Sectors 
in 2012.128 
 
Figure 3.   Development Projects Conducted under the Chinese Financial Aid 
as of 2012.129 
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Sri Lanka established a joint venture with China in 2013 to build and operate a 
port terminal in the Colombo harbor, and this investment provided China a considerable 
royalty from maritime activities conducted in the main commercial harbor in Sri Lanka. 
This arrangement ultimately led to security concerns in the IOR. Colombo International 
Container Terminals Ltd (CICT) was a joint venture between China Merchants Port 
Holdings Company Limited (CMPH) and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA), where 
CMPH holds 85 percent of the partnership, and the balance is held by the SLPA.130 This 
project, started in 2014, has been implemented as a Build Operate and Transfer 
Agreement (BOTA) with a 35-year–long lease for the CMPH under the Colombo South 
harbor expansion.131 The new terminal having a two-lane access channel to Colombo 
Harbor is capable of handling freight in the volume of 2.4 million Twenty-foot 
Equivalent Units (TEU) annually; thus, on one hand, it has increased the overall freight 
handling capacity of the Colombo harbor.132 On the other hand, having 85 percent of the 
operational rights in the new terminal, China maintains a royalty in the terminal 
operations. However, as noted by Jeff M. Smith, China’s investment in Colombo South 
Harbor correlates with the repayment of loans taken to construct the Hambantota 
harbor—US$ 30 million inclusive of its interest, annually; when the Chinese president 
visited Sri Lanka in 2014 he agreed to ease loan conditions on the basis of constructing 
and operating a new terminal in the Colombo harbor.133 Further, China’s operations in 
the Colombo harbor alarmed India, particularly when Chinese conventional submarines 
surfaced twice at the terminal operated by CMPH in the Colombo harbor—once in 
September 2014 and again in November 2014.134 By showing its underwater capabilities 
in the Indian Ocean, China appears to be using its bilateral economic ties with Sri Lanka 
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as part of its military strategy, a reminder of its plans to use Sri Lanka to open a second 
front in the 1962/63 Indo–Chinese War.    
The port-city project initiated in 2014 with an estimated value of US$ 1.5 billion 
together with previous financial commitments—$3.85 from 2009 to 2012—increase the 
total Chinese financial aid in Sri Lanka to a total of US$ 5.3 billion.135   Sri Lanka 
entered into another joint venture project with China in 2014—the Colombo port city 
project—an offshore city constructed in the vicinity of the Colombo harbor. According to 
the deal, China holds 46 percent of its ownership for 99 years through a long lease.136 
The port city has been designed as an alternative to the highly congested Colombo city, 
and it is to be developed as an “iconic business city” with the following features: 
“shopping and office complexes, water sports areas, a mini golf course, hotels, 
apartments, recreation areas, and a luxury yacht marina.”137 According to the 2014-plan, 
China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC)—the master developer of the project—
owns 46 percent in reclamation, 108 out of 233 hectares on a 99-year lease, and the Sri 
Lankan government owns the balance of the area—mainly allocated for the public and 
the common facilities—in the offshore city.138 Overall, this project has added another 
US$ 1.5 billion to the total investment in Sri Lanka by China, totaling $ 5.3 billion.   
The submarine issue appears as the second unintentional consequence that put Sri 
Lanka in a disadvantageous position in IOR geopolitics. Surfacing submarines twice in 
the Colombo harbor appears a part of China’s grand strategy in the Indian Ocean, which 
combines its soft power strategy and military strategy together. The submarine issue has 
brought a common doubt about whether China tries to exercise its military hard power 
strategies in the Indian Ocean, having committed Sri Lanka through its soft power 
strategies. Considering China’s military strategy in the 1960s against India in the Indo–
China war—using Sri Lanka’s territory for its war effort—together with the 2014 
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submarine issue, one can argue that China’s long-term strategy in the IOR, particularly 
against India, would be to use Sri Lanka—compelling Sri Lanka through soft power 
commitments—as a launching pad in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India’s interference in 
Sri Lanka’s port city project in 2015 shows how far the submarine issue of 2014 has 
affected Sri Lanka in both its domestic economic affairs and in its geopolitics in the 
Indian Ocean. 
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FROM 2015 TO 2017 
Section III shows that two main developments took place in Sri Lanka in the 
recent past—especially the post–2015 administration—that put Sri Lanka in between 
China and India in regional power politics. These developments emphasize that Sri 
Lanka’s heavy indebtedness to China has left a very little room for Sri Lanka to maintain 
a balance in IOR activities. India having witnessed China’s attempt to project its soft—
economic—and hard—maritime—powers in the IOR has applied more pressure on the 
post-2015 administration to limit China’s activities on the western coast of Sri Lanka—
the port city project. This attempt could not be realized as expected by India, mainly 
because of the already established bilateral agreements between Sri Lanka and China, and 
the Chinese interest in capitalizing its presence in Sri Lanka for a longer period—99 
years as per the terms of the long lease agreement. Sri Lanka having failed to capitalize 
on developed infrastructure—the Hambantota seaport and the airport—to make economic 
gains has leased the seaport to China for a longer period. Sri Lanka appears to be caught 
in China’s debt trap; whereas from China’s point of view, the latest developments in Sri 
Lanka exactly match with its String of Pearls strategy in the IOR.         
The new Sri Lankan administration in 2015 temporary halted the port city project, 
but resumed it in 2016 under a new name—“Colombo International Finance City” instead 
of “Colombo Port City.” When the new administration took over the country in 2015, the 
port city project was temporary halted on the basis of two main reasons—one overt and 
the other covert. The overt reason was that there was reasonable doubt a proper 
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environmental suitability study had not been done prior to commencing the project.139 
The covert reason was the pressure applied by the Indian government when India had 
expressed its concerns over the Chinese submarine issue, and Sri Lanka temporarily 
suspended the port city project just a week prior to the Indian prime minister’s visit to Sri 
Lanka that took place after 28 years.140  In response, the Chinese government indicated 
that the “project should be seen in continuity as the Chinese government had reached 
agreement with the last government to develop this project.”141 Having investigated the 
environmental issues, however, the Ministry of Megapolis and Western Development 
signed a revised agreement with CHEC in August 2016, and resumed the project under a 
new name of “Colombo International Financial City.”142 Further, the size of the 
reclaimed land has been increased under the renewed agreement with amendments to 
allocating areas in the offshore land, summarized in Table 5. Table 5 shows that the 2016 
agreement could do little other than increase the total reclaimed land area, increasing land 
owned by the government, but no overall changes to the project.  
Table 5.   Comparison of Two Agreements of Port City Project, 2014 vs. 
2016.143 
Land Distribution  Negotiated 
Position 
in 2014 Amendments 
In 
2016 
  Land (ha) % Land (ha) % 
Land allocated to CHEC on 99 year lease 108 46 110 41 
Land to Sri Lankan government 62 27 63 23 
Public areas 63 27 96 36 
Total reclaimed area 233 100 269 100
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The southern development plan has failed to bring economic gains to Sri Lanka as 
expected, and this situation has created an economic hardship for Sri Lanka in repaying 
its debts. Though the southern district—Hambantota—expected to develop as the second 
most important city of the country having constructed a deep seaport, an airport, an 
international conference hall, a cricket stadium, and a highway from Colombo to South, 
the country has not reached its economic expectations.144 As a result, the Hambantota 
development plan “struggled to break the inertia and come to life till 2016,”145  and the 
airport and the seaport did not attract the expected air and sea freight, causing not only a 
delay in developing an industrial zone in the area but also affecting the debt payments as 
per the agreed terms and conditions.146  
With the port and the airport running at an economic loss, Sri Lanka initiated debt 
renegotiation with China, which led to a new agreement in leasing the Hambantota 
seaport on a long-term basis to China, which eased Sri Lanka’s total indebtedness to 
China by US$ 1.2 billion. As reported by Tudor Wjenayake, during the 15th Asia Pacific 
Conference held at Hong Kong in November 2016, Sri Lanka declared that it will lease 
the Hambantota sea port along with a piece of land—1151 hectares in size—as a joint 
venture with China.147  After the debt renegotiations, Sri Lanka and China established a 
renewed agreement to operate the Hambantota port as a joint venture on July 29, 2017, 
just five days before the writing of this thesis, and when a joint venture had been now 
established between CMPH and SLPA.148 As per the agreed terms and conditions, 
CMPH will operate the Hambantota seaport for 99 years, while operating one of the 
terminals—the southern terminal—in the Colombo port as well.149  
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III. CASE STUDIES: PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH, AND VIETNAM 
This chapter is divided into two sections examining China’s behavior in two 
geopolitical settings: Pakistan and Bangladesh, for its String of Pearls strategy in the 
IOR, and Vietnam, for its hegemonic activities in the Southeast Asia and in the South 
China Sea. This chapter provides insight on which to draw important conclusions about 
how China has dealt with the three countries—Pakistan, Bangladesh and Vietnam—and, 
in turn, how these three countries have responded to China. This analysis can provide Sri 
Lanka a better picture of the large geopolitical setting. The first section of this chapter 
contains the two IOR case studies involving Pakistan and Bangladesh and is based on 
China’s financial assistance in developing infrastructure, particularly seaport 
construction. China’s success—the Pakistan case—and failure—the Bangladesh case are 
examined. Second section focuses on the third case study examining China’s hegemonic 
behavior—the Vietnam case. The first two case studies examine how China has 
succeeded in competing infrastructure developments in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the 
effects of this success on IOR geopolitics. The third case study examines China’s 
behavior in regard to Vietnam, including its affairs in the South China Sea, and considers 
what effects China can have in a hegemonic situation and how far the Vietnam model is 
applicable to IOR affairs.  
A. SECTION I: PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH CASE STUDIES 
China’s investments in and financial aid for development projects in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh resemble those of Sri Lanka in terms of the time period when the projects 
started, the reasons for Pakistan and Bangladesh to obtain assistance from China, and the 
nature of infrastructure development that has taken place in all three countries.150 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have all obtained financial assistance from China in 
the same period, starting from the 2005 up to 2014 and 2015.151 As argued by Thilini 
Kahandawaarachchi, China has become a favored financial partner for Pakistan, 
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Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka as an alternative to international financial organizations.152 
Seaports and the associated infrastructure development become the next common feature 
of China’s financial assistance in these countries.153 As emphasized by Ambassador 
Teresita C. Schaffer, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh do not seem to be challenging any of the 
powers in the IOR by developing their home ports; whereas, in the case of Pakistan, the 
construction of Gwadar port in the Indian Ocean has become an arena for its “epic rivalry 
with India”.154 Further, the amount of finance invested by China in Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
and Sri Lanka represents large sums—approximately US$ 17.8 billion in Pakistan, 3.8 
billion in Bangladesh, and over 5 billion in Sri Lanka.155 Thus, substantial investment is a 
feature common to the Pakistan and Bangladesh case studies as well as the Sri Lankan 
situation. 
B. CHINA’S FINANCIAL AID AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
IN PAKISTAN 
The Pakistan case study shows another successful story of China’s String of 
Pearls strategy in the IOR. China’s six economic corridors appear as one of its strategies 
to counter the U.S. strategy against China—an isolation strategy. Further, this case study 
shows how China has engaged with an ally of the United States and a rival of India—
Pakistan—in its String of Pearls strategy. At the same time, China has invested 
considerable finances in the IOR for the construction of seaports and related facilities in 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Using a common approach, China offers these 
countries a large number of agreements and MOUs that show the benefits for the lender, 
the investor, and the borrower: 51 MOUs with Pakistan and eight with Sri Lanka. 
Considering the geographical area and the demographic factors—such as tribal areas in 
Pakistan where extremists and terrorist groups are operating—the China Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) is likely to entail additional challenges while developing the 
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infrastructure in the corridor as well as in conducting these economic activities. This case 
study highlights the geopolitical challenges that the China–Pakistan partnership poses to 
U.S. and India’s interests in IOR affairs. By comparison, Pakistan enjoys greater freedom 
in conducting maritime activities in the Gwadar port with China, which might even 
extend from economic to military ones, or a covert combination. In such an environment, 
it is likely that the United States will play a more active role in IOR affairs, either through 
direct engagement or indirect engagement through a third party such as India. Further, 
how Sri Lanka manages and prevents the reemergence of China’s naval elements in Sri 
Lanka’s territorial waters, too, could become a critical factor when compared to the 
envisaged China–Pakistan maritime activities for balancing power in the IOR.     
Like Sri Lanka, Pakistan established diplomatic relations with China in the mid-
20th century, and both countries have engaged in political and economic activities since 
then.156 Pakistan has had diplomatic relations with China since 1951, and it became the 
first Muslim country to recognize the communist government of China—the PRC.157 As 
shown by Taimur L. Chaudhri, the bilateral relationship between the two countries shares 
an animosity towards India, and this relationship has evolved into a close strategic 
cooperation since the 1960s.158 Following are the key milestones highlighting economic 
ties between the two countries since the 1960s: 1) the signing of a trade agreement in 
1961 guaranteeing Pakistan the most–favored–nation treatment on a bilateral basis; 2) the 
Pakistani market in China for jute, textiles, and cotton in the mid-1960s, 3) the 
construction of the Karakorum highway linking Islamabad and the western Chinese city 
of Kashgar in 1972; and 4) the signing of a bilateral investment treaty in 1989.159 Further, 
bilateral trade between China and Pakistan in the late 20th century and early 21st century 
shows the healthy relations maintained by the two countries in recent history—US$ 768 
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million in 1994, 1.1 billion in 2000, and 4.2 billion in 2005.160 Further, China has also 
provided military and technical assistance to Pakistan over the years as an outcome of the 
strategic partnership between the two countries.161 
In turn, Pakistan has become a partner of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 
strategy of China. OBOR is a development strategy proposed by Chinese President Xi 
Jinping in 2013 to upgrade infrastructure in 65 countries across Eurasia, and it includes 
developing economic integration in its regional and political cooperation.162 The CPEC is 
one of six economic corridors—the remaining five are the New Eurasian Land Bridge, 
the China–Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, the China–Central Asia–Western Asia 
Economic Corridor, the Indo–China Peninsula Economic Corridor, and the Bangladesh–
China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor. The geographical locations of the six 
economic corridors are shown in Figure 4.163 CPEC connects with the Gwadar seaport, 
and as explained by Kahandawaarchchi, China considers Pakistan as geographically 
important because it connects the western Chinese region of Xinjiang to the oil-rich 
Middle East through Gwadar port, which cuts transportation costs and distance for 
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Figure 4.  Six Economic Corridors, 2015.165 
As shown by Riza Ahmad and Hong Mi’, Pakistan considers CPEC of the OBOR 
as a great opportunity to develop its economy, and the CPEC project includes huge 
infrastructure development funded by China.166 CPEC consists of the following 
economic projects: 1) connecting the Maritime Silk Route bordering the Indian Ocean, 
the Gulf states and East Africa, and all the way to the Mediterranean Sea, to land, a 
corridor through Gwadar port, 2) establishing the land route connecting Gwadar of 
Pakistan with Kashgar in western China, 3) the construction and upgrading of railways, 
4) the construction of pipelines connecting Gwadar and Kashgar for oil transportation, 
and 5) undertaking electricity power generation projects.167 The electric power 
generation projects will enhance Pakistan’s national grid by 10,000 megawatts (MW) by 
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2018, and the construction of an industrial park, too, has been included in the project.168 
The road network is going to be approximately 2,700 km in distance, which includes a 
1,100 km-long motorway connecting Karachi and Lahore.169 In addition, a railway track 
from Pesharwar to Karachi, and the Karakuram highway also will be extended from 
Rawalpindi up to the Chinese border.170 The idea of CPEC first came out in 2013, and a 
total of 51 agreements were signed between the two countries in 2015, when Chinese 
President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan.171 As highlighted by Ahmad and Mi’, Chinese 
banks and companies have agreed on over “$45.6 billion investments in energy and 
infrastructure projects in CPEC,”172 and the total investment agreed upon for the whole 
project as of 2015 was approximately $62 billion.173 
C. OUTCOMES, EFFECTS, AND IMPACTS 
A number of factors justify Pakistan choosing China as its main economic and 
development partner. Kahangawaarachchi, in responding to the question of why Pakistan 
has selected China for developing its infrastructure, points to three main reasons: first, 
China does not impose many conditions on its economic partnerships; second, the strong 
historical bilateral relationship; third, as a partner to balance the power in the region.174 
Highlighting the importance of historical bilateral relations in CPEC projects, as quoted 
by Kahangawaarchchi, the Chinese president characterized the strong bonds between the 
two countries as, “ China and Pakistan as iron friends, and all weather partners of 
strategic cooperation,”175 according to Pakistan’s prime minister who visited China in 
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2014.176 On the other hand, China’s partnership with Pakistan in its economic and 
infrastructure development activities appears to counterbalance India’s grand strategy of 
becoming an influencer in IOR activities.177 
Both China and Pakistan have a number of challenges in the successful 
completion of the CPEC project. Both countries have internal security issues, and 
Pakistan, in particular, is facing the effects of extremism and terrorism.178 As noted by 
Riaz and Mi’, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Lashkar–e–Jhanvi 
(LeJ), Daesh or ISIS, and the Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) could interrupt the 
smooth progress of the CPEC.179 Baluchistan is the largest province in Pakistan 
according to geographical size, with a relatively small population, and a large part of the 
CPEC including the Gwadar port falls either within or in close proximity to Baluchistan. 
Meanwhile, the tribal structure in Baluchistan and the central government of Pakistan 
have unsolved political and economic issues that might disturb the CPEC project.180 
Some of the politicians in the Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa (KPK) have opposed the CPEC, 
which appears as a major challenge for the progress of the project.181 When this situation 
is compared with Sri Lanka, China does not experience any kind of risk—in terms of the 
domestic security factor—as Sri Lanka has become a fully peaceful country since 2009.   
The United States and India appear as the two countries most concerned over the 
CPEC. Highlighting Beijing–Washington concerns, Lily Ouyang explains that the 
OBOR—with CPEC as a part of OBOR—is China’s counterbalancing strategy against 
the United States’ “Asia Pivot”182 strategy. China believes that the United States’ “pivot” 
represents a containment policy, though it has been officially denied by the United 
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States.183 China sees U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
military cooperation with Pakistan, as well as the strengthening of U.S. relationships with 
South Korea, Japan, India, and Vietnam as a part of a “China containment policy.”184 
Therefore, China has sought to reach other parts of the world through the OBOR, and the 
CPEC has become a significant effort in achieving OBOR goals.185 On the other hand, 
Delhi has more concerns about Beijing–Islamabad relations as Pakistan is trying to 
counterbalance India in its IOR activities through the CPEC.186 As emphasized by 
Kahandawaarachchi, the Pakistan military consider Gwadar beyond its economic 
capabilities, and expect that it will serve a considerable strategic purpose in maintaining a 
balance of power in the IOR.187  
The Pakistan case study highlights both positive and negative impacts on Pakistan 
from alignment with China. These impacts result from China’s String of Pearls Srategy 
and one of the China’s Economic Corridors running through Pakistan. The economic 
benefits that Pakistan expects to gain from the Gwadar seaport and from the huge 
infrastructure development projects coming up with the CPEC are many. Similarly, its 
indirect benefits, such as employment opportunities, developments solving Baluchistan’s 
water and electricity issues, and strengthening the country’s road network, are considered 
as positive impacts of its bilateral relations with China. Further, Pakistan might have 
calculated the Chinese factor to balance its military imbalance with India, and a strong 
relationship with China could strengthen Pakistan in its geopolitical setting. However, the 
huge amount of finance involved in infrastructure development projects—running as high 
as $ 17.8 billion—shows the danger of Pakistan becoming caught in a debt trap similar to 
Sri Lanka.   
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D. CHINA’S FINANCIAL AID AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
IN BANGLADESH 
The Bangladesh case study highlights two main aspects: an unsuccessful chapter 
of China’s String of Pearls strategy in building a seaport along its maritime route, and the 
reasons that compelled Bangladesh to drop China from the two competitors—China and 
Japan—opted to let Japan construct a deep seaport for the country. Though China tried to 
establish an agreement with Bangladesh for nearly four years—since 2012—Bangladesh 
opted for a Japanese proposal in Matarbari. Considering the distance between Sonadia 
and Matarbari—just 25 km—it is apparent that Bangladesh’s consideration was not the 
geographical location. Most likely, it would have been selecting a partner in the presence 
of U.S. and Indian factors. However, considering the friendly atmosphere facilitated by 
the Chinese when conducting trade with Bangladesh as compared with their Indian 
counterparts, and considering the number of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) that 
Bangladesh has established with China, it will remain as the main economic partner for 
Bangladesh. Further, as stated by the Chinese Ambassador in Bangladesh, China is very 
likely to negotiate with Bangladesh in establishing the Bangladesh–China–India–
Myanmar Economic Corridor through Matarbari. It is very unlikely, however, that any 
possibilities would persist for China to exercise its PLAN activities in Matarbari 
considering how Bangladesh has handled IOR affairs in the recent past, inviting countries 
other than the IOR power players—namely, Japan—to become involved in bilateral 
economic affairs with Bangladesh.     
Bangladesh established its diplomatic relations with China four years after 
Bangladesh was created as a separate country; thus, bilateral relations between 
Bangladesh and China started more recently as compared to Sri Lanka and Pakistan.188 
Bangladesh established a diplomatic relationship with China in 1975.189 Though 
Bangladesh was created after the 1971 Indo–Pak war, China did not recognize 
Bangladesh as an independent state, and even vetoed its application to become a UN 
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member.190 Nevertheless, the year 2015 marked the 40th anniversary of diplomatic ties 
between the two countries, and during the past four decades, the bilateral relationship 
between China and Bangladesh has dramatically improved, particularly in the economic 
sector.191 Bangladesh has become one of the main trading partners of China, and the two-
way trade between the two countries exceeded $12 billion in 2014.192   
Bangladesh’s geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean, particularly the 
Chittagong seaport, provides Bangladesh an advantageous position; thus, having 
identified such a value, China, India, and Japan have become competitors to establish 
economic collaborations with Bangladesh. As explained by Wade Shepard, Bangladesh is 
“politically and economically pliable”193—like a “ball of clay”194—and its geopolitical 
location has become a “preeminent global staging ground”195 for the interests of the east 
and west.196 Chittagong had been a major harbor in the “ancient Maritime Silk Road”197; 
where, historical evidence in the fourth century—in writing by the “Chinese traveler–
monk Faxian and Ibn Battuta”198—shows the use of the Chittagong port, including the 
Karnaphuli River on the northeastern part of Bay of Bengal in the ancient Maritime Silk 
Road.199   
From 1971 until the early-21st century, India was the main trading partner of 
Bangladesh, but, after 2004, China’s trade with Bangladesh has increased many times 
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overtaking Indo–Bangladesh bilateral trade.200 As highlighted by Pravakar Sahoo, 
although Bangladesh has conducted bilateral trade with India since 1971, India has 
continued to maintain a trade balance over Bangladesh, and achieved a comparative 
advantage in favor of India.201 India had insisted on non–tariff barriers and trade 
liberalism for Bangladesh, which resulted in a trade deficit for Bangladesh that continued 
as a common feature in bilateral trade between the two countries until approximately 
2004.202 By contrast, since that time, China’s trade relations with Bangladesh have 
boomed; and, economic and foreign policies of both countries have become conducive to 
promoting trade between them.203 Although this growing trade between China and 
Bangladesh later developed into FTAs, Bangladesh was reluctant to establish similar 
FTAs with India.204  As pointed out by Sahoo, China particularly had an interest in 
natural gas resources in Bangladesh, yet more importantly, looked at Chittagong seaport 
for trade in connecting the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor.205  
Bangladesh found two main competitors—China and Japan—to construct and 
operate a deep seaport for it, and India, too, became involved in the competition in 
demanding access for its cargo ships in Chittagong harbor. China and Japan became the 
main two competitors that proposed two locations for the construction of a deep seaport 
for Bangladesh—Sonalda by China and Matarbari by Japan. Initially in 2012, when 
Bangladesh sought China’s help to build a deep seaport at Sonadia, China responded with 
a project proposal, and agreed to provide loans to cover a major part of the project 
cost.206  India, on the other hand, sought port facilities for Indian cargo ships in the 
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Chittagong; in response, Bangladesh accommodated the Indian demand in June 2015.207 
The third competitor, Japan, suggested a separate option—another new port at 
Matarbari—just 25 km south of Sonadia.208 The geographical locations of Chittagong, 
Sonadia, and Matarbari considered for seaport projects by China and Japan are shown in 
Figure 5. Finally, Bangladesh consented to a contract with Japan to build a deep seaport 
in Matarbari after dismissing the Sonadia port option.209 However, as highlighted by a 
diplomatic correspondence with the Bangladesh Daily Star, the Chinese Ambassador in 
Bangladesh had indicated in October 2016 that China was interested in becoming a 
partner wherever the seaport would be built, showing China’s interest in advancing the 
Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor.210    
Although Bangladesh has become one of the main trading partners with China, 
and even disregarding the economic benefits from constructing a deep seaport at Sonadia, 
Bangladesh has avoided becoming a partner in the Chinese String of Pearls strategy. 
Compared to bilateral trade with India, Bangladesh enjoys greater economic benefits 
from trading with China, and the size of the economy engaged in bilateral trade with 
China in 2014 was equal to $12 billion. Bangladesh’s decision to construct a deep seaport 
at Matarbari with the financial assistance of Japan—instead of the Sonadia port under 
Chinese financial aid—could be viewed mainly as a geopolitical decision probably at the 
expense of economic benefits for China from having a Sonadia port connected with the 
Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor. By doing so, Bangladesh has 
become more nonaligned compared both with Sri Lanka and Pakistan in IOR geopolitics, 
thus avoiding possible pressure from the other power players in the Indian Ocean.  
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Figure 5.  Port Projects in Bangladesh as of 2016.211 
E. SECTION II: CHINA’S BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND ITS 
HEGEMONIC ATTITUDES WITH VIETNAM 
Vietnam has a number of reasons to support the argument that it experiences 
China’s regional hegemonic effects, and Vietnam has met with China’s coercive use of 
both soft and hard power over a longer period of time than the other cases. Vietnam has 
experienced different forms of pressure by China. First, having once been an integral part 
of China and a tributary state, Vietnam has experienced direct forms of both hard and soft 
power. Immediately after becoming the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the 
1950s, and in the 1970s in fighting the Vietnam War, the country received soft power in 
the form of military and training assistance. By contrast, the country directly experienced 
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the effects of China’s hard power during the 1979 China–Vietnam war, which was 
followed by China’s application of soft power in isolating Vietnam in the post–1979 war. 
China’s indirect ways of influencing Vietnam’s governance structure and the use of 
conditioning and encouragement techniques served as soft power tools to influence 
Vietnam. By the end of the 20th century, Vietnam had become heavily dependent on 
China for its trade.  At the same time, China has been investing in Vietnam to develop 
two of its economic corridors—an economic belt connecting China’s Guangxi, 
Guangdong, Hainan, Hong Kong, and Macau with ten coastal provinces of Vietnam. 
Finally, China applies soft power coercion in the South China Sea, although it sometimes 
appears as hard power with the involvement of PLAN. Therefore, China’s regional 
hegemony over Vietnam is reflected in a combination of a number of soft and hard power 
techniques that appear to be a part of geopolitics in the South East Asia. In this context, it 
is very unlikely that China would able to exercise such power politics in the IOR.    
The bilateral relationship between China and Vietnam has deep roots, and 
Vietnam had been an integral part of China in past.212 From the historical perspective, the 
Han dynasty invaded Vietnam for the first time in 111 BC, and controlled Vietnam as a 
part of China for longer period.213 Vietnam’s history shows its interconnectedness to 
China developed over several centuries prior to beginning of the Common Era, and the 
Vietnamese first appeared as scattered communities living along the southern coast of the 
Asian continent, from the Yangtze estuary in the northern part of the Red River Delta.214 
Most of these people were later absorbed into the Chinese empires in the south, 
particularly during the Han dynasty, and these former Vietnamese constitute part of the 
majority of the Han race living in modern China.215 Vietnam, even after becoming an 
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independent country in the tenth century, accepted and described itself as having a 
tributary relationship with China.216 
The Sino–Vietnamese relationship continued in the colonial era, too, despite the 
two countries having experienced different colonial and imperial effects in the 17th and 
18th centuries. In the 1880s, France established a protectorate over northern and central 
Vietnam, and brought the tributary relationship with China to an end; however, the 
cultural and intellectual bonds that had existed between the Chinese and Vietnamese 
societies could not be stopped.217 Instead of parting the two nations, Western imperialism 
and colonization strengthened the mutual affinity between the two countries, which 
resulted from a shared humiliation that both countries had experienced at the hands of the 
West.218 Although the Vietnamese could not call on assistance from the Qing dynasty in 
the mid-19th century when China was undergoing the effects of Opium War and unequal 
treaties, the intellectuals of both China and Vietnam continued to interact with each 
other.219 As highlighted by William J. Duiker, the continuity of bilateral relationships—
formal and informal—assisted both countries in incorporating Western sources of ideas 
and institutions into their Confucian societies.220    
China recognized the DRV and provided assistance for Vietnam to fight against 
the French in Indochina. A consequence of the Pacific War—the Japanese surrender in 
August 1945—created a political vacuum in Vietnam, and the Vietminh created a 
provincial republican government—the August Revolution—with Ho Chi Minh as the 
president.221 The new republic of Vietnam was formally named as the DRV, and China 
became the first country to recognize the DRV.222  The DRV consolidated north and 
central Vietnam with the assistance of Chinese expeditionary forces, and towards the 
                                                 
216 Duiker, “China and Vietnam: the Roots of Conflict,”  1. 
217 Ibid., 8. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Schoppa, Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History,  55; Duiker, 
China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict, 8.  
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid., 16. 
222 Ibid.  
 54
mid-1950s China extended its support to the DRV by providing military equipment and 
training of personnel and by announcing the signing of a military aid agreement to fight 
against the French in Indochina.223 Thus, bilateral relations in the 1950s appeared as 
China’s support for Vietnam’s struggle for independence, based on long-lasting relations 
between the two countries over the centuries.224   
China and Vietnam had been wartime allies during the Vietnam War in the mid-
1970s. As highlighted by Duiker, for generations China and Vietnam had been wartime 
allies, and during the Vietnam War, China had provided financial and material support—
worth over $10 billion—for Vietnam’s reunification.225 Such support from China to 
Vietnam eventually led to the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, and the unification of 
Vietnam under communist rule.226 Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh once declared the 
relationship between China and the Vietnamese revolution as a “thousand ties of 
gratitude, attachment, and love, a glorious friendship that will last forever.”227  
The Sino–Vietnamese War, on the other hand, marks the breakdown of the 
historically friendly relationship between China and Vietnam, and China’s response to 
Vietnam’s aggression against Cambodia could be considered as an indication of China’s 
regional hegemonic role in the 1970s. Towards the latter part of the 1970s, the 
relationship between the two countries turned frigid over the issue of Cambodia, and in 
response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late 1978, China not only cut off its 
aid, but also invaded Vietnam in February 1979.228  Chinese forces crossed the Vietnam 
border at several points, and China had placed two armies in the border areas, backed up 
by another eight divisions of local forces when its forces—comprising about 100,000 
troops—crossed the border against the 60,000 to 80,000 Vietnamese closer to the Chinese 
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frontier.229  During the invasion Vietnam had nearly 600,000 combat troops, but its 
cream was operating in Cambodia.230 Although Chinese forces suffered heavy casualties 
within a month of a shortened campaign, China’s direct involvement in regional affairs 
could be in one way viewed as a start of a China’s regional behavior—to “teach a lesson 
to Vietnam.”231    
Clearly, the bilateral relationship between China and Vietnam ruptured in the 
Sino–Vietnam War in 1979. Yet, China continued to keep away from Vietnam in 
bilateral relations until its withdrawal from Indochina, which could be considered as use 
of soft power against Vietnam in the post–Sino–Vietnam war period. As highlighted by 
Minh Be, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia brought the following negative impacts to 
Vietnam:  1) economic sanctions by the international community including China; 2) 
failure to be considered for membership by the UN, IMF, and World Bank, 3) elimination 
of or reduction in aid from some official development assistance (ODA) donors, like 
Japan and Sweden; and 4) opposition from China.232 In such a situation, the Vietnamese 
economy heavily depended on the USSR’s aid, which was not sustainable when the 
Soviet economy experienced a downturn in the early 1980s.233  Such conditions brought 
Vietnam under a political and economic crisis, the Communist Party of Vietnam decided 
to reestablish its relationship with China.234 Sino–Vietnamese relations once again 
became friendly in the wake of the Vietnamese unconditional retreat from Indochina in 
1989.235 Thus, China used its hard and soft power against Vietnam in regional affairs in 
the latter part of the 20th century, and could be considered as an example of China 
exercising regional hegemony directed at Vietnam in the 1980s.  
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Vietnam introduced six basic principles in 1990 as economic and political 
reforms, and recognized China’s significance for Vietnam. The Vietnam Communist 
Party (VCP) defined six basic principles to drive the country through its grand strategy, 
and the six principles were as follows: 1) an advance to socialism is necessary, and 
reforms and renovations will not change the socialist objectives; 2) Marxism–Leninism is 
always the ideological foundation for the VCP; 3) the political reforms are aimed at 
strengthening the proletarian system; 4) maintaining the role of the leadership in the party 
is necessary; 5) democracy must be accompanied by centralism, and it should be led by 
the party; and 6) patriotism is integrated with the proletarian system and includes socialist 
internationalism.236 As highlighted by Jorn Dosch and Alexander Vuving, the first four 
principles of the VCP are identical to the four principles introduced by Deng in China’s 
reforms in 1979, and Vietnam in the 1990s considered China its giant neighbor most 
significant to its economic development.237  
Vietnam’s governance structure shows similarities to the PRC in six major ways 
where one country can influence another in its governance structure. As explained by 
Dosch and Vuving, the six major ways that one country can influence governance 
structure of another include: 1) unilateral imposition of governance structures by a 
foreign power; 2) imposition of a foreign model of political organization; 3) influence in 
the form of encouragement by a foreign actor; 4) convergence through regional 
integration; 5) imitation by a host country of an attractive model; and 6) inheritance of 
“the political model of its colonial master” by a given country.238 Vietnam’s governance 
structure seemed considerably influenced by the Chinese model both in the post-colonial 
and post-Cold War periods.239 Furthermore, other than the six ways of influencing the 
government structure, China has used conditioning and encouragement techniques to 
transplant the Chinese model into Vietnam in the 1950s.240 
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China has become Vietnam’s leading trading partner since the early–21st century, 
and China has been involved in improving rail and road infrastructure in Vietnam which 
have assisted China in developing two of its economic corridors. Since 2005, China has 
become Vietnam’s leading trade partner, and “bilateral trade reached $ 10.42 billion in 
2006”—Vietnam had exported $ 3.03 billion worth goods to China and imported $ 7.39 
billion worth of goods from China.241 During the APEC Summit hosted by Vietnam in 
2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao entered into 11 cooperation agreements, which 
included Chinese assistance to develop and improve its road and railway infrastructures 
in two economic corridors—the economic belt connecting China’s Guangxi, Guangdong, 
Hainan, Hong Kong, and Macau with ten coastal provinces of Vietnam.242 
Vietnam’s economy has gradually become more dependent on China. When 
China and Vietnam reestablished diplomatic relations in 1991, Vietnam’s trade with 
China had been estimated as $ 32. 2 Million.243 In the early 1990s, Vietnam considered 
Japan and ASEAN as the main trading partners, and in 1996 Vietnam’s trade with 
Taiwan was higher than its trade with China.244 Vietnam’s trade with China in 2006 has 
been recorded as $ 9.6 billion, and according to the WB records, bilateral trade between 
the two countries has risen to $ 50 billion in 2013—10 percent of Vietnam’s export and 
28 percent of its import.245 As highlighted by Kevin, Vietnam is largely depending on 
China for some of its major import industries which include footwear, garments, textile, 
and furniture.246 The bilateral relationship developed close ties, and in the year 2009 
alone, VCP had held 290 meetings with its Chinese counterparts, and these numbers 
indicates both Vietnam’s desire to remain close with China, as well as how China’s 
economic soft power attracted Vietnam towards it.247  
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China holds a strong interest over the control of the South China Sea, and 
Vietnam has become one of the victims of China’s maritime influence in that area. The 
South China Sea occupies a significant geographical position, especially in terms of 
international shipping lines, passing through Malacca and approaching China, Japan, and 
other countries in the Southeast Asia.248 The South China Sea accounts for nearly 10 
percent of the annual global fisheries harvest, and so, has become an extremely important 
sea for the fishing industry. Further, this region is rich in oil and natural gas resources; 
thus, it has caught the attention of nations neighboring the South China Sea.249 Therefore, 
China particularly, and Vietnam and the Philippines have made the most significant, 
forceful claims in the South China Sea.250  
China’s “nine-dashed line” in the South China Sea delineates the most powerful 
claim, one which China has submitted to the UN along with a marked up map illustrating 
the area. At the same time. Vietnam and Malaysia have made their submissions to the UN 
seeking extended maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. As shown in Figure 6 
(with the nine-dashed line in red), China has claimed “historical waters” or “historical 
rights” to resources exceeding the ratifications of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS).251 China’s claims have been based on island features in the South China 
Sea: the Paracel and the Spratly Islands and their territorial waters, including an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelves.252 As highlighted in the International 
Crisis Group’s Asia Report No. 233, China’s claims within the nine-dashed line and to 
the Islands are based on surveying expeditions, fishing activities, and naval patrols 
conducted since the 15th century; China mapped them in 1914 and the Republic of China 
officially declared them in 1947 under the Kuomintang government.253     
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Figure 6.  China’s Claimed Territorial Waters under the Nine-Dashed Line 
as of 2012.254  
The Vietnam case study shows not only the dangers of China’s hegemonic 
behavior, but also how China has exploited historical narratives to its advantage. China’s 
relationship with Vietnam is going well beyond the China–Indochina Peninsula 
Economic Corridor and bilateral economic activities—Vietnam as a part of China, 
Vietnam under China’s tributary system, China’s military support in the Vietnam War, 
and China invading Vietnam over the Cambodian issue. Therefore, the China–Vietnam 
relationship differs from China–Pakistan, China–Bangladesh, and China–Sri Lanka  
 
 
                                                 




relationships and from bilateral activities. However, China’s hegemonic behavior against 
Vietnam mostly could be identified and related to the previously mentioned historical 
narratives. Therefore, China’s responses to historical narratives show Sri Lanka the 
possible dangers of establishing long-term agreements with the larger power.     
 61
IV. ANALYSIS  
The analysis chapter tests the central hypothesis in qualifying the two probable 
answers for the research question. The two answers qualifying the hypothesis are: 1) the 
successful adoption of nonalignment will balance Sri Lanka’s geostrategic interests with 
major power players in the IOR—the United States, China and India. 2) A failure to 
adopt nonalignment will make Sri Lanka subject to China’s coercive soft and hard power, 
compelling it to align more actively with the United States and India to keep its 
geostrategic interests balanced. Therefore, this chapter focusses on following aspects: 1) 
bilateral relations and power coercion between Sri Lanka and China. 2) Two other power 
players in Indian Ocean—the United States and India—and their IOR interests. 3) Sri 
Lanka’s foreign policy with major powers in Indian Ocean, and lastly 4) China’s 
economic and geopolitical interests leading to power coercion and regional hegemony—
an analysis of case studies.  
Sri Lanka now has established new agreements with China to operate the 
Hambantota harbor as an outcome of debt renegotiations, and the agreements include 
establishing an industrial zone. Further, the port city project has resumed its reclamation 
work, and Hambantota airport has not been included in the new agreements. Against this 
background, Sri Lanka needs to maintain a balanced posture in its foreign relations, 
particularly with the major power players in the IOR, and any tight alignment—
alignment with China in this case, and even an imbalanced realignment with India or the 
United States—might become problematic over the long run. Thus, nonalignment appears 
to be the most appropriate principle to guide Sri Lanka’s foreign relations and protect its 
geostrategic interests. 
This chapter initially analyzes to what extent Sri Lanka has become beholden to 
China and influenced by China’s soft and hard power in the form of financial aid. 
Secondly, it analyzes the interests of the two other power players—the United States and 
India—in Indian Ocean affairs, and the importance of Sri Lanka to them. The third part 
of this analysis focuses on how Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has swung from nonalignment 
to alignment, and then to realignment in the contemporary period, showing available 
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options for Sri Lanka to maintain a balanced relationship with the three power players in 
the Indian Ocean. The final part of this chapter analyzes the three case studies, and relates 
their lessons to the hypothesis for validation.  
A. BILATERAL RELATIONS AND POWER COERCION BETWEEN SRI 
LANKA AND CHINA  
This section tackles the following two questions as a foundation for analyzing Sri 
Lanka’s relations with China in relating bilateral relations and alignments to pressure 
from hard and soft power: Has Sri Lanka always aligned with China from the 
historical perspective to the contemporary period? Do the economic benefits 
enjoyed by Sri Lanka appear as a part of the disguised soft and hard power of 
China, disturbing the balance of geostrategic interests of Sri Lanka in the IOR? As 
shown in Figure 7, Sri Lanka has a long history of aligning with China from the first to 
the 16th century, but the bilateral relations between Sri Lanka and China in the post-
independent period show a clear break in that alignment. Sri Lanka’s policy was 
nonaligned from 1950 to 1977, but after that period, Sri Lanka began aligning with the 
United States and the West. However, in the late post-independence period—from 2005 
to 2015—Sri Lanka has realigned with China mainly because of the financial aid and 
infrastructure development agreements established between the two countries. Today, the 
United States appears as the alternative power player with Sri Lanka could realign—
similar what it did in 1977 and 2015. At the same time, India also appears as an effective 
competitor for the realignment, particulary in light of India’s influence in the temporary 




Figure 7.  China’s Hard and Soft Power Coercion Effects on Sri Lanka from 
the First Century to 2017.255  
  
                                                 
255 Findings abstracted from the Chapter II show that China is in a great position to use its soft power 
against Sri Lanka, and it has attempted to exploit its hard power, too, when it wanted to use Sri Lanka as an 
additional front against India in the Indo-China War and sent its submarines to the Colombo harbor in 
2014. Thus, this scenario suggests China uses possible soft and hard power coercion against Sri Lanka 
while maintaining economic relations between the two countries. Sri Lanka experienced negative effects 
from changing its bilateral relations leaning toward one country or bloc, and such bilateral relations have 
reflected on Sri Lanka as alignments or realignments in disturbing its balanced foreign policies. As a result 
of aligning with China, which resulted from economic activities—particularly financial aid and 
infrastructure development from China—Sri Lanka has become more beholden to China, showing the 
dangers of bowing to pressure from China’s soft and hard power.   
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The economic activities highlighted in Figure 7—trade, financial loans and 
agreements, bilateral MOUs, and grants and donations—have delivered a number of 
economic benefits enjoyed by Sri Lanka; however, these benefits have corresponding soft 
and hard power effects that ultimately favor China. In comparing the number of benefits 
reaped with the amount of debt Sri Lanka has accumulated from late post-independence 
bilateral relations, Sri Lanka has stepped in a debt trap set by China’s soft power. 
Beholden to China, Sri Lanka cannot extricate easily itself from the trap while operating 
two ports and a port city on a long-lease basis. Furthermore, because these soft-power 
development project enabled China to display its underwater maritime capabilities in Sri 
Lanka’s territory, inevitably associated Sri Lanka with China’s hard power. Such projects 
and predicaments reflect a trend. A comparison of Chinese assistance to develop 
infrastructure in the early and late post-independence periods show that the infrastructure 
developed in the early post-independence had been more concentrated to develop the 
industrial sector—especially rubber—while in the late post-independence period, 
developments have focused on the service sector—ports, an airport, roads and highways. 
This reflects China’s use of soft power in individual countries to advance its regional 
strategies and initiatives, and to solidify its position as rival to the Unites States and 
India.      
Debt negotiations and a renewal of agreements show that Sri Lanka remains 
aligned with China. The underperformance of the new harbor in attracting international 
shipping ventures affected repayments of debt to China, and it eventually led to debt 
renegotiations. As a result, Sri Lanka was forced to enter into a new agreement, allowing 
China to operate the Hambantota port for 99 years on a lease basis. Together with the 
resumption of the port city project, China now has become the most favored power player 
in the IOR, using Sri Lanka’s geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean. 
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B. TWO OTHER POWER PLAYERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THEIR 
INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND SRI LANKA 
Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key 
to the seven seas in the 21st Century, the destiny of the world will be 
decided in these waters. 
—U.S. Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan256  
1. The United States 
The Indian Ocean has become an important or critical theater for the United 
States for a number of reasons.257 The following are the main reasons that make Indian 
Ocean important or critical for the United States: first, as highlighted by Peter 
Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner, “there is a high probability that the Indian Ocean 
will develop into a fully-fledged region with self–identity and mature political, economic, 
and military institutions.”258 Considering the political, economic, and military potential 
of China and India in IOR activities, the United States foresees the potential of this 
region, and given the percentage of the global population in these two countries—36.4 
percent of the global population—the IOR becomes more and more important 
economically.259 Second, the IOR is likely to develop similar to Northeastern Asia or 
Western Europe, and the United States and China are likely to expend their political 
capital, material resources, and diplomatic skills in ways that may or may not be 
welcomed by the Indian Ocean countries. Third, the United States would likely attempt to 
exercise its regional leadership through another power such as India, and such a 
relationship will be in terms of sea services—the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marines, and the 
U.S. Coast Guard.260 Fourth, the Indian Ocean is likely to emerge as a zone of conflict 
between the world’s superpower—the United States—and its emerging challenger—
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China.261 Lastly, it is important how an interaction of four nuclear powers—the United 
States, China, India, and Pakistan—in the Indian Ocean, would contribute to regional and 
global peace.262  
As highlighted by Dombrowski and Winner, the United States would continue 
with its Neo–Nixon doctrine for IOR affairs.263 Though the United States has vital 
military and political interests over the IOR, it does not require playing a leading role to 
guarantee security in the Indian Ocean, and it can achieve the same effects by facilitating 
multipolar regional arrangements through strong democratic states.264  This approach 
features the Nixon Doctrine where it limited the unconditional security guarantee to 
smaller allies; instead, the United States provided aid and advice to its local partners to 
provide their own defense.265 In this context, the United States would likely consider 
both India and Pakistan as democratic partners to maintain security and stability in the 
IOR. Furthermore, an opportunity to keep Sri Lanka in its favor would be a bonus for the 
United States, allowing that power to exploit its maritime strategies. It would do well to 
remember how Trincomalee, a natural harbor ideal for maritime operations, provided 
similar advantages to the British Navy in the WWII.   
William C. Martel highlights how the U.S. strategy of containment applies to the 
IOR.266 Theoretically, the strategy of containment helps the United States contain the 
risks to its interests and values by other states, groups, and movements. In the case of 
IOR, Martel highlights that U.S. strategic interests in the IOR are peace, security, and 
prosperity.267 Although the United States’ grand strategy of containment emerged during 
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the Cold War, the updated grand strategy to match with IOR affairs consists of three main 
elements—political, economic, and military.268 As declared by President Barack Obama 
in January 2012, the United States would engage in a pivot in its strategy towards the 
IOR and Asia.269 Specifically, Martel highlights the United States’ concerns in the 
IOR as security and economic issues and the rise of China as an emerging power in 
the region.270 
Sri Lanka holds an important value in U.S. defense strategies in the IOR. With its 
natural harbor in Tricomalee, Sri Lanka holds an important position in the whole region, 
and by its mere geographical location at a strategic place in the Bay of Bengal, 
Tricomalee harbor has become one of Sri Lanka’s “most valuable assets.”271 The natural 
design of the harbor can assure the safety of a fleet during the monsoon, from October to 
March. Further, Trincomalee always dominates the Bay of Bengal and the Eastern Sea; 
thus, any power that controls this harbor has a greater advantage from a naval and 
strategic perspective.272 Currently, the bases used by the U.S. Air Force in South Asia are 
in Thailand and Singapore, but “the DOD [Department of Defense] study shows that New 
Delhi is 1600 nm [nautical miles] from Bangkok bases and Saudi Arabia is 2600 nm from 
Singapore.”273 Thus, Sri Lanka becomes a potential candidate for the United States to  
consider for the establishment of another military base, possibly through defense treaties 
similar to those it has with Singapore. 
2. India 
India’s unique geographic location forms a foundation to dominate the Indian 
Ocean, and India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had emphasized that India’s 
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independence and survival depends on India’s control over the Indian Ocean.274 From 
India’s point of view, the Indian Ocean has a great impact on India’s economy and 
security. Thus, India’s national strategy and maritime doctrine have been formulated on 
the basis of defending its maritime interests in the IOR.275 India imports nearly 70 
percent of its oil through IOR to its various ports; therefore, it seeks greater control, as 
well as greater stability of the maritime activities in the Indian Ocean.276 India’s strategy 
over the Indian Ocean has not been limited to maritime security only for its oil 
transportation; India also exercises its soft power by becoming a major investor in 
regional mining, oil, and gas projects conducted in the IOR.277  
India considers the “Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean,” and both India and China 
have their concerns about IOR strategies against each other. India’s unique geographical 
location in the Indian Ocean promotes its aspirations to dominate the IOR, or to 
transform it to India’s Ocean.278 Many Indian strategies and nationalists see the IOR as 
India’s “rightful domain” and contend that “India needs to play a significant role in the 
region to develop the peace, prosperity, and cooperation.”279 Further, because of India’s 
unique geographic positioning and aspirations to be the dominant power player in the 
region, “Indian politicians and strategists pay a greater attention to the linkages between 
the Indian Ocean and Indian security.”280 Therefore, India’s soft power politics and naval 
capabilities highly concentrate on geopolitical developments in the IOR. Further, India 
has particular concerns about China’s String of Pearls strategy in the IOR, and often 
accuses China of trying to surround India through its grand strategy.281 Thus, India’s 
grand strategy has always aimed to strengthen its naval power in the IOR.282 On the other 
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hand, China is also observing India’s IOR strategy, and it has viewed the launching of 
Vikrant—the first Indian aircraft carrier—as India’s ambition to dominate the Indian 
Ocean.283 Since the late 20th century, India has established a wide–ranging strategic 
partnership with the United States. Since 1998, the United States and India have 
transformed their relationship at a breathtaking pace and it has developed into a wide 
strategic partnership.284 As highlighted by Colin Geraghty, rebalancing its global 
engagements, and acknowledging the growing importance of the Asia–Pacific region, the 
United States has recalibrated and strengthened the bilateral relationship with India in the 
recent past.285 Geraghty further emphasizes that three main factors invite America to 
strengthen its relationship with India: “its democratic nature, the demographic factor, and 
the economic weight of India.”286 
India, having perceived that protecting the South Asian region from extra–
regional powers is a part of its strategy, has substantial influence over a number of 
countries in South Asia. India has fought three wars against Pakistan, and the Kashmir 
issue has always been a hotspot between the two countries since 1947.287 India was 
involved in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, and India has influenced Bangladesh in 
its internal affairs.288 India was also involved in Sri Lanka’s internal conflict with the 
LTTE by showing two faces—training Tamil militants initially in the early 1980s, and 
conducting military operations against the LTTE under the Indo–Sri Lanka Peace Accord 
in the late 1980s.289 Therefore, India plays a vital role with the countries in the IOR, 
showing its subregional hegemonic influence in IOR affairs.   
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An analysis of facts and arguments emphasizes the importance of the IOR for the 
three major power players—the United States, China, and India—and their involvement 
in geopolitics in the IOR, as shown in Figure 8, has had many impacts on Sri Lanka. 
Though the United States seems to be adopting a cooperative strategy in IOR affairs, 
considering its strategic pre-eminence and the importance of IOR as a geographical space 
for the development of power and resources, Sri Lanka becomes an important destination 
to the United States, particularly with reference to Trincomalee natural harbor. China has 
already been involved with Sri Lanka with its String of Pearl strategy and has added Sri 
Lanka as a three-in-one pearl—Hambantota, Colombo harbor, and Colombo port city. 
Considering how India has behaved with most of the countries in the IOR—either as a 
stabilizing or destabilizing influence, or some combination of both—Sri Lanka needs a 
cordial relationship with India in IOR affairs. Therefore, Sri Lanka has an important role 
to play IOR geopolitics with regard to these three main power players, and it needs to 
adopt a careful and nonaligned approach with them.   
Figure 8 shows the interests, varying from regional stability and cooperation to 
economic strategies, of the major power players in the IOR. The geostrategic value of Sri 
Lanka in the Indian Ocean becomes an important factor that can entangle the interests of 
the IOR power players with Sri Lanka. Thus, the interests of the IOR power players and 
their involvement with Sri Lanka must underpin Sri Lanka’s foreign relations, swinging 
from alignment and realignment to nonalignment. Sri Lanka’s alignment and realignment 
strategy with the power players makes a loop linking causes and effects—the interests of 
the United States, China, and India in the IOR and the impact of those interests.    
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Figure 8.  Interests of the Major Power Players in the IOR and their Effects 
on Sri Lanka as of 2017. 
C. SRI LANKA’S FOREIGN POLICY WITH THE MAJOR POWERS 
Since independence, the two main parties—the UNP and the SLFP—either as a 
single party, or as a coalition, have governed the country. The foreign policy of Sri Lanka 
has had significant changes depending on the political party that came to power through 
the democratic process, which allows the people to select the government.290 Sri Lanka’s 
foreign policy has aligned and realigned from the capitalist to the socialist bloc—with the 
United States, Soviet Union, China, and India. Table 6 summarizes the changes in 
government since 1948, and this section shows key features of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy 
under the following time periods: 1948 to 1956—UNP, 1960 to 1977—SLFP, 1977 to 
1996—UNP, 1994 to 2002 and 2005 to 2015—SLFP, and from 2015 to date—combined 
UNP and SLFP.  
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Table 6.   UNP and SLFP Governments since Independence, 
from 1949–2017.291 
 
Figure 9 depicts the correlation between Sri Lanka’s foreign policy changes and 
the corresponding reactions by the three power players. Sri Lanka, being a small nation, 
has experienced soft power coercion from powerful counties in the past, even though it 
maintained a nonaligned foreign policy with powerful nations. Although Sri Lanka 
became a nonaligned country, particularly in the Cold War period, the United States 
wanted Sri Lanka to become aligned with the capitalist bloc. When Sri Lanka’s foreign 
policy more closely aligned with the United States in the late 1970s, India considered it 
as indifferent; Sri Lanka ignored India and the U.S.–Sri Lanka relations threatened India. 
More recently, Sri Lanka experienced negative effects in changing its foreign policy from 
                                                 
 
291 Adapted from Madanayaka, Unique Features of Foreign Policy of UNP Regimes and 
Bandaranayake Regimes, 219, 223;  A. Sivarajan, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy since 1994 (Peradeniya: 
University of Peradeniya, 2003), 5, 12–19. 
Duration Government Foreign Policy 
1948–1956 UNP Pro-British 
1956–1959 SLFP Nonalignment  
1960 UNP Nonalignment 
1960–1965 SLFP Nonalignment, but strong 
relations with China  
1965–1970 UNP Nonalignment 
1971–1977 SLFP-led coalition government Nonalignment, but strong 
relations with China 
1977–1994 UNP Pro-United States and West 
1994–2001 SLFP Nonalignment 
2002–2004 UNP  Nonalignment 
2005–2015 SLFP led coalition government  Pro-China 
2015 to date Combined UNP-SLFP Pro-United States and India, 
but strong relations with 
China 
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alignment to realignment—becoming more aligned with China. This realignment 
occurred when the United States and India became involved in Sri Lanka’s domestic 
politics in the 2015 elections, and later India pressured Sri Lanka to change its economic 
relations with China over issues involved in constructing the Colombo port city project. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Correlation between Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Changes and the 
Reactions by the United States, China, and India from 1948 to 2017.    
Analysis of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka since its independence shows that with 
the change in political parties coming to power through the democratic process, policy 
has changed. The foreign policy adopted in the periods of 1960–65 and 1971–77 struck a 
balance with China and India, even allowing for flexible relations with the United States. 
Mr. and Mrs. Bandaranayke attempted to keep Sri Lanka as a nonaligned country even 
when the Cold War was in full swing. Despite being a smaller country, Sri Lanka was 
strengthened by its nonaligned foreign policy, going so far as to invite China and India to 
a conference table in the immediately after the Indo–China war . Further, the healthy 
foreign policies adopted by Sri Lanka in the 1960–65 and 1970–77 periods assisted the 
country to resolve vital issues with India—a maritime demarcation between the two 
countries and the Tamil labor issue.  
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The 1977–1994 UNP government realigned its foreign policy as pro–United 
States and pro–Western, and India saw this shift as a threat to India and IOR affairs.292 
As highlighted by Neil De Votta, India viewed the changes in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy 
of 1977 as a deliberate undermining of India’s regional security concerns. In particular, 
India considered the following events as a threat to its security: 1) discussions held by Sri 
Lanka to lease an oil tank farm—100 oil tanks—located at strategically important 
Trincomalee; 2) an agreement reached with the United States to host an powerful Voice 
of America radio station in Sri Lanka; and 3) a request for military assistance from 
Britain and Israel intelligence agencies to fight against LTTE.293 India responded to Sri 
Lanka’s foreign policy alignment with the United States and the West by training, 
arming, and strengthening Tamil rebels through its leading intelligence agency, the 
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which negatively affected Sri Lanka, and 
eventually led to a 30-year-long internal conflict.294 
Though the combined UNP–SLFP government of 2015 initially attempted to 
make its foreign policy more aligned with the United States and India while leaving 
China behind, the heavy indebtedness and investments Sri Lanka had with China 
reshaped its foreign policy to a balanced one with the major powers. With the change of 
the government in 2015, the United States, Japan, and India also sought to rebalance the 
strategic shape of Sri Lanka through political and economic engagements.295 
Dharmawardana reports the allegations against the United States and India for supporting 
the Sirisena–Wickramasinghe government’s rise to power, with an understanding that 
each would promote the other’s core interests. At the same time, the new government 
came under pressure from India to suspend the port city project in the latter part of 
2015.296 As shown by Gowen and Seneviratne, Sri Lanka could not suspend the port city  
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project for a longer period because China claimed that it had entered into an agreement to 
construct a port city on reclaimed land.297 In late 2016, the current government started 
discussions with China to operate the new port in Hambantota, as well, under a long-term 
leasing joint venture.298  
D. BEHAVIOR OF SRI LANKA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE INTERESTS 
OF THE MAJOR POWER PLAYERS  
This section establishes another two questions to examine the findings with the 
hypotheses: Has Sri Lanka’s foreign policy been affected by the geopolitical interests 
of the major power players in the IOR? Could Sri Lanka become a nonaligned 
country through realignment? Sri Lanka needs to identify the geostrategic interests of 
the three major power players in the IOR, and Sri Lanka can play an important role in 
IOR geopolitics in order to develop its economic prosperity and maintain stability. China, 
as identified from its interests in IOR affairs, is mainly concentrating on economic 
activities—both in terms of the String of Pearls strategy and the supply of oil—while 
maintaining its ongoing interest in its military affairs—particularly India’s maritime 
power projection in the IOR. India, having historically proved that it is capable of 
interfering in the internal affairs of others in the IOR, values its security over economic 
strategies in the IOR. The United States seems more focused on stability in the IOR over 
its other interests, such as the IOR as the geostrategic space for the development of power 
and resources. 
Alignment and realignment correlate with the interests of the power players in the 
IOR; on the other hand, alignment caused negative effects on Sri Lanka in the past. As 
elaborated in Figure 8, different IOR interests of the three major power players correlate 
with the geostrategic importance of Sri Lanka. The possibility of Sri Lanka becoming  
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aligned or realigned with the three of the power players depends on how Sri Lanka’s 
economic and foreign policies accommodate the interests of those players. As shown by 
past experience, once Sri Lanka becomes aligned or realigned with one power player, the 
it is likely to alienate one of the other power players, and may experience some negative 
reactions. Three such examples of negative responses to Sri Lanka’s alignments and 
realignment are as follows: 1) in 1977 when Sri Lanka aligned with the United States, 
India reacted by training LTTE cadres; 2) when Sri Lanka realigned with China in the 
2005–2012 period, the United States raised legal claims against Sri Lanka for human 
rights violations in the UN Security Council, and 3) when Sri Lanka realigned with the 
United States and India in 2015, China told Sri Lanka that it would continue the port city 
project.  
Previously, Sri Lanka has gained an international reputation and economic 
benefits from its nonaligned foreign policies; therefore, Sri Lanka could benefit from 
being a nonaligned country yet again in the comparative geopolitics of the IOR. 
Historically, the nonaligned foreign policy has not only provided Sri Lanka an 
advantageous position in its international relations, but also assisted Sri Lanka in 
achieving its economic and geopolitical aims. Thus, nonalignment appears as to be the 
best suited approach. Among the key achievements Sri Lanka has accomplished through 
a policy of nonalignment are remaining unaffected by external powers, and playing an 
independent role as a mediator in foreign affairs (as in the Colombo Conference that 
brought India and China to the conference table in the aftermath of the 1963 Sino-Indian 
war). Therefore, Sri Lanka must realign its policies to become a nonaligned country in 
IOR affairs. In this situation, if Sri Lanka fails to become nonaligned, possibly because of 
its economic activities linked to China now, Sri Lanka might further strengthen its 
relationship with the United States, considering the U.S. interests in the IOR—
cooperative strategy and regional stability.       
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E. CHINA’S ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS LEADING 
TO POWER COERCION AND REGIONAL HEGEMONY: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE CASE STUDIES  
It is useful to study China’s behavior—a blend of economic soft and military hard 
power—with other countries, both within and outside the IOR, to relate that behavior 
with IOR power politics in general and Sri Lanka’s geopolitical interests with IOR power 
players in particular. Thus, this section focuses on the case studies to extract lessons 
about China’s economic and geopolitical interests, its use of power (both soft and hard), 
and its pursuit of regional hegemony: The Pakistan and Bangladesh case studies show 
two opposite outcomes from establishing seaports that support China’s maritime silk 
route strategy. Bangladesh has struck a balance in its trade and infrastructure 
development by having adopted a multiple partner approach. Pakistan having had a long 
lasting bilateral relationship with China—“iron friends” as expressed by China—has 
allowed China to develop its CPEC, which consists of a port construction, inland road 
and highway construction, and a number of other economic projects worth more than 
US$ 62 billion. Gwadar port, which is the gateway for the CPEC to the Indian Ocean, 
shows both soft power—economic—as well as hard power—military—potential with the 
concurrence of both countries. In comparison to Sri Lanka’s situation in 2014 when 
Chinese submarines surfaced in Colombo and India responded to it—pressuring Sri 
Lanka either to give up the port city project or include India in the project—Pakistan is 
unlikely to experience comparable interference by another IOR power. Thus, the Gwadar 
port brings more advantages to China than the Sri Lankan ports. The Bangladesh case 
study differs from that of Pakistan as China has not succeeded in developing a deep 
seaport at Sonadia. The construction of Matarbari’s deep seaport with Japanese financial 
aid, instead of Sonadia under Chinese financial aid, teaches two lessons beyond China’s 
failure to expanding its soft and hard power in the IOR. First, we can see how Bangladesh  
has effectively used its foreign policy to create a balance in IOR geopolitics, and second, 
it illustrates how influential Indian is in IOR affairs—particularly in regard to its desire to 
use Bangladesh’s seaports for trade.  
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The Vietnam case study, even though it falls outside of IOR geopolitics, offers a 
number of lessons about China’s behavior in Southeast Asian and South China Sea 
geopolitics. China’s bilateral relations with Vietnam tell a different story than China’s 
relations with the IOR countries, particularly with its historical background. Together 
with the South China Sea affairs, the Vietnam case study brings a number of lessons 
about China’s hegemonic behavior. As shown in Figure 10, China achieved its regional 
hegemony over Vietnam through its soft power; Vietnam became heavily dependent on 
China for its trade since the end of the 20th century. Vietnam also experienced of Chinese 
military potential (hard power) in the China-Vietnam War. Chinese hegemony in the 
South China Sea, particularly in considering its argument for an EEZ centering on the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands—based on its perceived historical rights to the islands—
allows one to draw possible similarities in the IOR, particularly for the port city of Sri 
Lanka—funded, developed, and to be used under a 99-year-long lease by China.  
Foreign policy can play an effective intermediate, as well as a decisive, role in 
positioning a country to achieve balance in its foreign affairs. Figure 10 shows the 
exertion of soft and hard power  in the three case studies, and a possible hegemonic status 
(in the case of Vietnam); in which Pakistan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, without an 
effective use of foreign policy, are very unlikely to strike a balance of power in their 
relations with China. The Bangladesh case study shows how a change in alignment 
through foreign policy that adopted a multi-player approach corrected an imbalance and 
reduced the undue power China held in their bilateral relations.  Therefore, the three case 
studies show Sri Lanka the danger of bilateral relations exclusively favoring China versus 
a balanced approach to IOR geopolitics through effective foreign policy. Such an 
approach entails a strategy of alignment to realignment, and then to nonalignment—to 





Figure 10.  Effects of China’s Financial Aid and Infrastructure Developments on 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Vietnam, and Pakistan and Vietnam 
becoming Aligned with China, Effects as of 2015.299    
 
                                                 
299 Chapter III—Case Studies of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Vietnam—shows a relationship between 
the volumes of bilateral economic activities and the alignment possibilities. Either the regional hegemonic 
effects—China’s regional hegemony over Vietnam—or the use of new infrastructures developed under 
China’s financial aid as soft and hard power coercion have influenced Vietnam and Pakistan into becoming 
more aligned to China. Examples of the latter are the use of Gwadar seaport and CPEC in Pakistan. By 
contrast, Bangladesh has avoided such alignment to China by inviting Japan to construct a deep seaport, 
Matarbari, and has become more balanced with the IOR power players.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The following statement by U.S. Secretary of Treasury William Simon, after a 
meeting held with Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimao Bandaranayke in April 1975, 
indicates the effectiveness of nonalignment as a key principle in Sri Lanka’s foreign 
policy when dealing with the global superpowers and regional powers alike in the 1970s: 
On April 21, I had a candid, highly satisfactory meeting with Prime 
Minister Bandaranayke of Sri Lanka. We covered a broad range of 
international, and domestic, economic and political issues.… She said Sri 
Lanka was not a bigger nation and wanted to make its own way. 
Substantial assistance, however, was essential through the present very 
difficult economic period…. On international political issues, the Prime 
Minister said Sri Lanka will continue a carefully balanced approach to 
large nations, specifically mentioning the Soviet Union, PRC, India, and 
Pakistan…. I congratulated her on Sri Lanka’s hosting of the 1976 Non-
Aligned Conference. 300 
     
  
As Simon understood, it was a fact that not only had the policy of nonalignment served 
Sri Lanka to maintain a balanced relationship with powerful countries in the 1970s, but it 
also enabled Sri Lanka to become an active partner among the nonaligned members, and 
to maintain the tempo of the NAM—with Sri Lanka hosting the NAM conference in 
1976.  
In comparing Sri Lanka’s economic climate of the late 20th century, particularly 
in the 1970s, with that of the early 21st century—from 2008 to 2015—I note that Sri 
Lanka needed external financial and economic aid in both periods. As the U.S. 
Department of State documented at the time, Sri Lanka’s economic status in 1973–1976 
necessitated large–scale external financial assistance.301 Sri Lanka’s pragmatic, 
nonaligned foreign policy had helped Colombo to seek support from both the East and 
                                                 
300 Office of the Historian, “Foreign Relations of the United States,” 1969–1976, Volume E-8; 
Document on South Asia, 1973–1976, 85. 
301 Ibid., 95. 
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the West, showing India that Sri Lanka had other windows on the world.302  Prime 
Minister Bandaranayke recognized the importance of having good relations with the 
United States, despite the fact that leftists in her own government opposed such relations. 
Thus, in the 1970s, Sri Lanka struck a balance between East and West without 
antagonizing India, showing how far nonalignment had grown as the most suitable 
principle for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, particularly in dealing with powerful countries.  
By contrast, from 2008 to 2015 when the debt trap was set, Sri Lanka failed to 
maintain the policy of nonalignment, and became more closely aligned with China. This 
tipping of the balance will have important ramifications. As shown in Figure 9, despite its 
close alignment with China in the 2005–2015 period, Sri Lanka made unsuccessful 
attempts to realign with the United States and India in 2015/16. These attempts were 
likely stymied because recent joint economic activities have made Sri Lanka more 
beholden to China. Therefore, this chapter concentrates on the ways and means of 
becoming nonaligned through realignment, and to make Sri Lanka balanced in its 
relations with powerful countries.    
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The analysis of China’s financial aid to Sri Lanka and its geopolitical effects 
culminates in two types of recommendations:  specific and general. A number of factors 
discussed in this thesis and their analysis show how China’s String of Pearls strategy 
erodes the Pearl of the Indian Ocean: Sri Lanka. China’s financial aid to Sri Lanka, and 
its geopolitical effects, inform recommendations specific to Sri Lanka, but these 
recommendations create a broader model suitable for countries economically similar to 
Sri Lanka. Thus, this recommendations section first presents four policy 
recommendations related to debt repayment, multinational investments, and defense 
policy considerations. Second, this thesis presents a model that incorporates common 
features applicable to most economically weaker countries. The model can enable such 
countries to maintain a balance of power in their international affairs when obtaining 
financial assistance from economically stronger countries.  
                                                 
302 Ibid.  
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1. Policy Recommendations Specific to Sri Lanka 
 
This thesis makes four main recommendations for Sri Lanka. They include 
foreign, economic, and defense policy considerations, and these recommendations focus 
not only on maintaining Sri Lanka’s geostrategic interest in the IOR, free from China’s 
soft and hard power coercion, but also to avoid becoming unduly influenced by the two 
other IOR power players—the United States and India: 
Paying off the balance of the debt to China. Sri Lanka needs to pay off the 
balance of the debt and free itself from China’s debt trap in order to avoid China’s soft 
power coercion. Out of the US$ 5.3 billion of total indebtedness to China, Sri Lanka has 
now waived $ 1.2 billion, having established new agreements with China to operate 
Hambantota harbor as a joint venture on a long-term lease basis. As the port city project 
has resumed without changing its terms and conditions, the $1.5 billion investment by the 
Chinese remains unchanged; therefore, Sri Lanka now owes $ 2.6 billion to China. Sri 
Lanka might have to consider borrowing from the IMF or the World Bank in order to get 
rid of China’s debt trap.     
Opening Hambantota industrial zone for other international investors.  Sri 
Lanka has agreed to provide space for China to develop an industrial zone closer to 
Hambantota harbor. The envisaged industrial zone—a China–Sri Lanka joint venture—
together with the Hambantota harbor operated by China. This is likely to create a 
monopoly in China’s favor with its heavy economic activities—Hambantota harbor, 
Colombo port city, and Colombo harbor—on the southern and western coasts of Sri 
Lanka. Similarly, this arrangement is again very likely to become an incentive for China 
to use its soft power coercion against Sri Lanka to further Chinese geostrategic interests 
in the Indian Ocean. To avoid such a disadvantageous position, Sri Lanka may consider 
inviting other international investors to invest in the new industrial zone. Invitations 
might be extended to India, Japan, and other East Asian economies like the Republic of 
Korea and Malaysia, as potential partners for the Hambantota Industrial Zone.     
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Keeping the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Activities away from 
Sri Lankan harbors and territorial waters. Sri Lanka needs to avoid China’s 
endeavors to use Sri Lanka for its military strategy. The historical evidence suggests that 
China uses its economic soft power to support its military strategies in the Indian Ocean 
and advance its military strategy, which has included using Sri Lanka to open an 
offensive front in the Indo–China War and as a port for Chinese submarines to surface 
twice in 2014 at the Colombo harbor. Therefore, Sri Lanka needs to keep the PLAN 
activities at a distance, not only from Sri Lankan harbors including Hambantota, but also 
from Sri Lanka’s territorial waters.     
 
Involving the United States and India more in future investments and 
development projects in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, even though it has become a middle-
income country in the recent past, still needs external financial support to become an 
economically stable country. Against such a background, Sri Lanka must concentrate on 
making India and the United States more involved in future investments and development 
projects, and by doing so, Sri Lanka will secure a better geopolitical position by 
becoming a nonaligned country.      
2. Model for the Economically Weaker Countries Depending on 
Stronger Economies  
Findings of this thesis, though mostly applicable to Sri Lanka and drawn from the 
concepts of indebtedness as well as soft and hard power coercion, enable one to develop a 
common model for weaker economies to follow when considering bilateral relations with 
stronger economies. Sri Lanka’s example—including the debt trap set by China—
together with the Pakistan and Vietnam case studies show how smaller economies can 
become vulnerable to pressure from larger countries that supply them with aid. By 
contrast, the Bangladesh case study shows an escape from an unfavorable geopolitical 
situation. Figure 11 presents the lessons drawn from this thesis and offers a model 
showing how weaker countries can avoid power coercion scenarios when dealing with 
stronger economies.   
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Figure 11 shows that the dependency of economically weaker countries on 
stronger economies, in most cases, changes the foreign policies of the weaker countries 
from balanced to imbalanced. As a result of indebtedness, the weaker economies have 
naturally aligned with the lending countries, affecting their neutrality or nonalignment in 
foreign relations. Indebtedness leads to soft power coercion from the stronger economies, 
and the situation even might lead to hard power coercion by the military. Weaker 
countries need to be mindful of the limits of soft and hard power coercion against them, 
as well as the hegemonic status of the partner exerting that pressure. The weaker might 
have to make a realignment with a stronger country in order to protect its own 
geostrategic interests and maintain some control.   
 
 
Figure 11.   How weaker countries can realign to nonalignment successfully, 
2017 and beyond. 
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3. Recommendations for Further Studies 
This thesis suggests a twofold recommendation for future research: first, a greater 
engagement of existing scholarly work and important historical cases in adopting 
nonalignment as the governing principle for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. Second, a 
separate in-depth study in searching suitable joint venture economic and infrastructure 
projects could be conducted with the United States and India. 
Greater engagement of existing scholarly work and important historical 
cases. The hypothesis tested and the finding of this thesis advocate nonalignment as the 
best-suited governing principle for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, and future research work 
engaging existing and historical cases would reaffirm Sri Lanka adopting nonalignment 
in its foreign policy. A separate study delving deeper into existing scholarly work on the 
necessary conditions for nonalignment success and a reexamination of important 
historical cases would provide a much broader view on political, economic, and social 
factors related to adopting nonalignment as the main principle governing Sri Lanka’s 
foreign policy. Such a study would sharpen the policy recommendations made by this 
thesis, and place Sri Lanka in a strong position to withstand future geopolitical challenges 
in the Indian Ocean. 
How the United States and India could best be more involved in future 
investments and development projects in Sri Lanka. Though this thesis has 
recommended making the United States and India more involved in future investments 
and development projects in Sri Lanka, it has not conducted a major investigation to 
identify the most suitable project(s) for such considerations. Considering the interests of 
the United States and India in Indian Ocean geopolitics, and the geographical importance 
of Sri Lanka in IOR affairs in particular, this thesis suggests an in-depth study into where 
such development opportunities might exist and how the United States and India might 
participate jointly with Sri Lanka in those opportunities. Outcomes of such research, 
together with the findings of this thesis, would not only facilitate Sri Lanka to maintain a 
nonaligned principle in its foreign affairs, but also keep the country from being caught in 





In conclusion, the IOR is likely to become the most attractive region in the future 
in terms of both economic and military potential, and such demanding geopolitical values 
show how important it is for small nations, like Sri Lanka, to retain a balance in 
geopolitical activities with their power players. Alignment with a particular country or 
bloc in this kind of scenario would likely bring negative effects to the weaker countries—
weaker in economic and military potential—when stronger countries attempt to impose 
power coercion on weaker countries to achieve their geopolitical goals. In such a 
geopolitical scenario, Sri Lanka needs an immediate realignment to become a nonaligned 
country. David Brewster highlights the possible changes in IOR geopolitics in the future, 
and such changes are quite pragmatic and highly relevant to Sri Lanka, in adjusting its 
foreign relations:      
In coming years, the Indian Ocean is likely to experience a period of 
considerable strategic uncertainty that will involve new players and new 
challenges.  Although the United States is likely to continue to be the 
strongest military power in the Indian Ocean for a long time to come, there 
is a risk of a significant decline in its regional presence and in its 
credibility as a reliable security provider.  At the same time, the 
emergence of India and China as major naval powers will lead to a much 
more multipolar region.  Of particular concern is the growing strategic 
competition between India and China, which has the potential to 
profoundly impact the stability and security of the region.  
Dr. David Brewster303 
  
  
The analysis of findings in this thesis shows that both the conditions of the central 
hypothesis—Sri Lanka’s success or failure to integrate nonaligned principles when 
establishing new economic agreements or renegotiating its debt payments with China—
will impact the balance of its geostrategic interests with the major power players in the 
IOR. Most likely, an imbalance will occur—as when Sri Lanka has become more closely 
                                                 
303  Ceylon Today, “Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy:  Choice in a Changing World, June 2017, 
http://www.slforeignpolicy2017.lk/abstracts.html 
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aligned with China Thus, it needs to realign with the United States and India to strike a 
balance in its geopolitics in the IOR.  
The case study chapter showed the possibilities of losing balance and rebalancing 
in bilateral relations with between small countries and China or other major powers in the 
IOR: a win-win situation similar to Bangladesh or soft and hard power coercion leading 
to hegemonic effects similar to Vietnam. Considering the geostrategic interests of the 
United States and its cooperative strategy, and its endeavors in achieving regional 
stability in the IOR through domestic partners, Sri Lanka might have to consider the U.S. 
option to protect its own geostrategic interests and its economic benefits in the IOR. 
However, as shown in Figures 8 and 9, Sri Lanka should also consider India while 
realigning, paying particular attention to its previous consequences of brushing India 
aside. Sri Lanka has the greatest advantage in keeping an independent foreign policy in 
the post-debt negotiation period, which requires realignment of its relations with major 
power players. Keeping an independent foreign policy seems to increase the probability 
of Sri Lanka protecting its geostrategic interests. Yet, the 2015 failed realignment and Sri 
Lanka’s entering into new agreements with China for Hambantota port and the Port City 
are indications of a failure to realign and put Sri Lanka at risk of China’s soft and hard 
power coercion.   
Finally, nonalignment could be the center of gravity in holding a balanced 
position both in geopolitics and the international political economy of the 21st century. 
The necessity for economically weaker countries to defeat the poverty trap sometimes 
pushes them toward debt traps when these states fail to strike a balance in their 
international economic relations. Such imbalance always reflects the imbalance of the 
foreign policies of a country, which initially puts them under the power coercion of the 
stronger nations, and ultimately leads to geopolitical issues both in regional and global 
contexts. To be more precise in considering Sri Lanka’s situation with China—
imbalanced economic relations make Sri Lanka more beholden to China—reflecting its 
aligned foreign policy that worried the other two power players in the IOR. In light of the 
admirable geopolitical reputation Sri Lanka gained when it followed a policy of 
 89
nonalignment during the middle of the 20th century, Sri Lanka should see that policy as a 
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